

**AIR NATIONAL GUARD  
DEPLOYMENT  
TO USAF AREA**

1961 - 1962



USAF HISTORICAL DIVISION OF

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**AIR NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT TO USAF AREA**

**1961 - 1962**

**By**

**Mr. Royce E. Eckwright**

**December 1962**

**USAF Historical Division OI**

# FOREWORD

This study was prepared in conjunction with the semiannual histories of the United States Air Forces in Europe between June 1961 and December 1962 and with the active cooperation of the mobilized Air National Guard STAIR STEP commanders. It has been published in monograph form to permit wider distribution and utility than is possible in the semiannuals.

The keen interest and support of the STAIR STEP units, the Headquarters USAFE staff and the Director of Information, Colonel Mark H. Gilman, made publication of this study possible and are gratefully acknowledged.

Like all US Air Force historical studies, this monograph is subject to revision on the basis of additional information which may become available at a later date, and suggested changes or corrections will be welcomed.

  
ROYCE E. ECKWRIGHT  
DAFC  
Chief, Historical Division OI


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We are very proud of the speed, efficiency and professionalism with which both our Reserve Forces and our active duty forces met the current challenge.

Mr. Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force

# STAIR STEP DEPLOYMENT BASES 1961-1962



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AIR NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT TO USAFE AREA

1961 - 1962

A. THE BACKGROUND

Reappraisal of the nation's military posture by the new Kennedy Administration in the early months of 1961 necessarily centered around the paramount defense problem of "How Big Is Enough."<sup>1</sup> The strategic concept adopted by the United States would determine the answer to this question. In turn, the kind of strategy the Administration planned to employ in the event of war would determine the kinds and quantities of weapons systems that would be developed, produced, and operated by the US Armed Forces in peace and war.

By early April, President John F. Kennedy, in his talks with Allied leaders, and his spokesmen at meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), had outlined a major revision of the United States and NATO military strategy based upon an increase in the West's conventional war capabilities, to make the use of nuclear weapons the last—rather than the first—recourse for meeting nonnuclear Soviet aggression.<sup>2</sup> This strategy would require a NATO and United States capability to respond to any conventional attack with conventional resistance that would be effective at least long enough to force a pause and to place the onus of using nuclear weapons first, if necessary, upon the Russians. If successful, this new strategic concept could

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raise the "nuclear threshold" and provide for a "pause" after a limited attack, enabling both sides to think things over before resorting to all-out nuclear war. Associated with this thinking was an increased effort on the part of the United States to preclude any accidental or erroneous employment of nuclear weapons.

In his second State of the Union speech of the year, on 25 May, the President requested an added \$100 million in Fiscal Year 1962 defense funds to modernize the Army's equipment; to mechanize the divisions in Europe; to provide an airborne brigade in both the Pacific and Europe, and to support a program that would enable 10 Army reserve divisions to go into combat within eight weeks of the outbreak of war.<sup>3</sup> The President also requested \$60 million for a US Marine Corps increase of 14,000 men; an immediate \$531 million investment in a redoubled effort to overtake Russia in the space race, and reorganization of the Civil Defense program. Concurrently, plans for dropping certain bombardment and tactical squadrons from the US Air Force inventory were being shelved.

A Department of Defense (DOD) spokesman said in June that the Kennedy Administration was not going to reduce the nuclear strike potential, but would try to bolster other types of military capability so as to give the US Armed Forces greater flexibility and a wider choice of responsiveness to aggression, including "brush fire" incidents, Communist armed infiltration tactics, and guerrilla warfare.<sup>4</sup> The United States would still come to the rescue with nuclear weapons, if the NATO forces were about to be overwhelmed by

[REDACTED]

a Communist bloc nonnuclear attack. For his part, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Lauris Norstad,\* was reported to have taken the position that use or nonuse of nuclear weapons in Europe would depend upon the military situation and not necessarily on the question of whether or not the other side used the weapons first.

The NATO defense strategy of the late 1950's had been based upon the employment of tactical atomic weapons by the "Shield" forces to meet any major attack, and the presumption that this concept, in itself, would act as a deterrent against an enemy not willing to provoke an all-out war and the intervention of the American strategic air "Sword" forces with their massive nuclear retaliation. <sup>5</sup> Assuming that the major nuclear deterrent forces of East and West canceled one another out in the decade of the 1960's, the problem still confronting the NATO was how to deter or resist minor, or even major, local aggressions and limited hostile actions. This task would fall to the "Shield" forces equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons, and the strategic concept for the employment of these forces would have to embody a decision of paramount importance, i.e., at what point in a major aggression by superior conventional forces should the vastly outnumbered NATO "Shield" forces resort to nuclear arms?

General Norstad pointed out to his subordinate commanders toward the end of 1960 that, because the NATO forces frequently engaged in

\* Unless otherwise stated, all military personnel mentioned in this study are US Air Force personnel.

[REDACTED]

exercises involving the use of atomic weapons as being the most serious and difficult type of warfare, some member countries felt that this was not only the type of conflict most likely to occur, but also that it was the only one for which the NATO was preparing. 6. Nothing, he said, could be further from the truth. The NATO "Shield" forces were designed to bridge the gap between an all-or-nothing response, to give validity to the principle of the deterrent. Then, it must be made clear to all concerned that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation would use whatever force was necessary to defend its territory, but it did not propose to use more force than was necessary.

In short, SACEUR's basic strategy for Allied Command Europe (ACE) required that these forces be organized, equipped, trained, and deployed so as to react promptly and effectively with either conventional weapons when they were adequate to the military situation, or atomic weapons when the use of such weapons was necessary. Except in certain well-defined cases of direct self-defense, however, atomic weapons were to be introduced into the battle only after a particular decision to do so had resulted from the operation of an established decision-making process. This process would insure that such a decision would in all cases be taken by an authority at a level higher than that of the basic combat unit.

Addressing NATO military leaders in April 1961, President Kennedy pledged that the United States during his administration would remain "firmly committed to the full defense of Europe." 7 He added that the NATO must keep an effective nuclear capability, but should also

accomplish a general strengthening of its conventional forces. The United States, Mr. Kennedy said, would make sure its nuclear weapons never would be used irresponsibly; by exercising "continuous responsible command and control from the highest authorities all the way downward . . . before and after the initiation of any hostilities."

In a meeting with President Kennedy at Vienna in June, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev touched off a new Berlin crisis by declaring his intention of signing a separate "peace treaty" with East Germany before the end of the year, which would mean the ". . . liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin."<sup>8</sup> The President replied in substance that unilateral Soviet actions could in no way alter the United States occupation rights and commitments in Berlin. There appeared to be little ground for diplomatic compromise in these opposing East-West views.

Throughout the remainder of 1961, the United States took a great many actions to partially mobilize its ready reserve forces, examine its civil defense program, and modernize and bolster the armed forces, particularly in the NATO area.<sup>9</sup> The military measures taken by the Kennedy Administration during that period were a reflection not only of the Soviet threats to Berlin but also of the longer-range United States strategy concept revisions which had begun before this crisis flared up.<sup>10</sup> Without abandoning the implicit threat of global war as a means to deter Soviet actions in Berlin, and while seeking to increase the invulnerability of the strategic forces, it was clear that the Kennedy Administration was attempting in 1961 to develop

ways of using military force to influence directly the course of the conflict over Berlin.

After a careful assessment of the value of nuclear weapons to the West on the continent of Europe, the President had apparently decided to place major reliance upon conventional forces. He sought to raise the threshold under which the United States-NATO forces could tactically check Soviet military action without the introduction of nuclear weapons. Thus, the President seemed to believe that, in a period when both sides might not want to use their cataclysmically destructive strategic military power, the ability to bring force to bear selectively and locally on the battlefield, might prove to be crucial.

The Administration evidently felt that nuclear deterrence alone would not be effective in protecting the basic Allied rights in Berlin, since the Soviet bloc could always resort to minor, but progressive, moves that would make the use of nuclear weapons by the West appear <sup>11</sup> unjustified. On the other hand, critics of the "graduated deterence" philosophy, in which an armed conflict would be commenced by the West with conventional weapons only, argued that it might reduce the risks involved for the Soviets in limited aggression to such an extent that they would be encouraged to employ conventional war as a policy in Europe.

Amidst this speculation one fact stood out at the end of the first year of the latest Berlin crisis: Premier Khrushchev still had not signed his separate "peace treaty" with the puppet German Democratic Republic, despite his threats in 1961 to do so before

<sup>12</sup>  
the end of the year. On the other hand, he remained committed to this action.

## B. UNITED STATES MILITARY BUILDUP PLANNING 1961

### 1. Reserve Force Mobilisation

Early in August 1961, the Congress gave the President authority\* to call up for extended active duty a maximum of 250,000 Ready Reservists of all the United States military services.<sup>13</sup> The Department of Defense quickly issued an "advisory notice" to appropriate state governors and military commands of the Continental United States (CONUS). Based on these actions, US Air Force (USAF) Headquarters in August alerted 64 Air National Guard (ANG) units, two Air Force Reserve (AFR) wings, and five other AFR squadrons, as "priority units for possible recall." These units were authorized to speed up training and to recruit the necessary "prior service people" to attain full manning strengths. An estimated 25,000 ANG and 3,000 AFR personnel were included in this initial US Air Force recall alert.

On 1 September, nine ANG wings and two AFR wings totalling 35 squadrons of tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, fighter-interceptor, and air transport aircraft were recalled to active duty, effective 1 October 1961, presumably for a period of one year.<sup>14</sup> The recall of three ANG F-104 squadrons and their supporting units, effective 1 November 1961, raised the total of federalized ANG

\* Public Law 117, 87th Congress

ALERTED AMB AND AFR UNITS - AUGUST 1961

PLS 2

AIR FORCE RESERVE

435th TC Wing, Homestead, Florida  
77th TC Squadron, Donaldson, South Carolina  
76th TC Squadron, Barksdale, Louisiana  
442nd TC Wing, Richards-Gebaur, Missouri  
305th TC Squadron, Tinker, Oklahoma  
303rd TC Squadron, Richards-Gebaur, Missouri  
304th TC Squadron, Richards-Gebaur, Missouri

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Alabama

117th TRW, Birmingham  
106th TRS, Birmingham ✓  
160th TRS, Montgomery ✓  
115th AC&W Squadron, Dothan

Arizona

161st Fighter-Interceptor Group, Phoenix

Arkansas

184th TR Squadron, Fort Smith ✓

California

146th Air Trans Wing, Van Nuys  
146th Air Trans Group, Van Nuys  
115th Air Trans Squadron, Van Nuys  
195th Air Trans Squadron, Van Nuys

Colorado

140th TF Wing, Denver  
X 120th TF Squadron, Denver

AIR NATIONAL GUARD (CONT'D)

Connecticut

103rd AC&W Squadron, Milford

Georgia

117th AC&W Flight, Savannah  
129th AC&W Squadron, Marietta

Illinois

✓ 169th TF Squadron, Peoria

Missouri

✓ 170th TF Squadron, Springfield

Indiana

122nd TF Wing, Fort Wayne  
✓ 113th TF Squadron, Terre Haute  
✓ 163rd TF Squadron, Terre Haute

Iowa

174th TR Squadron, Sioux City ✓  
133rd AC&W Flight, Fort Dodge

Massachusetts

102nd TF Wing, Boston  
✓ 101st TF Squadron, Boston  
✓ 131st TF Squadron, Westfield  
101st AC&W Flight, Worcester

Michigan

127th TR Wing, Detroit  
107th TR Squadron, Detroit ✓  
171st TR Squadron, Detroit

Minnesota

133rd Air Trans Wing, Minnesota-St. Paul  
133rd Air Trans Group, Hqs.  
109th Air Trans Squadron, Minnesota-St. Paul

Mississippi

153rd TR Squadron, Meridan /

Missouri

131st TF Wing, St. Louis  
✓ 110th TF Squadron, St. Louis  
✓ 180th TF Squadron, St. Joseph  
157th TC Group, Hqs, St. Louis  
131st TC Squadron, St. Louis

New Hampshire

133rd Air Trans Squadron, Manchester

New Jersey

108th TF Wing, McGuire  
✓ 119th TF Squadron, Atlantic City  
x 141st TF Squadron, McGuire

New York

✓ 136th TF Squadron, Niagara Falls  
✓ 138th TF Squadron, Syracuse  
139th Air Trans Squadron, Schenectady  
152nd TC Group, Hqs, Roslyn  
106th TC Squadron, Roslyn  
108th AC&W Flight, Syracuse

Ohio

121st TF Wing, Columbus

Ohio (Cont'd)

✓ 162nd TF Squadron, Springfield  
✓ 164th TF Squadron, Mansfield  
✓ 166th TF Squadron, Columbus  
112th TF Wing, Toledo  
123rd AC&W Squadron, Blue Ash

Oklahoma

125th Air Trans Squadron, Tulsa

Pennsylvania

112th AC&W Flight, State College

Rhode Island

102nd AC&W Squadron, Howard

South Carolina

169th Fighter-Interceptor Group,  
Columbus

Tennessee

134th FI Group, Knoxville  
119th AC&W Flight, Alcoa

Virginia

x 149th TF Squadron, Richmond

Washington, D.C.

113th TF Wing, Hqs  
x 121st TF Squadron

Wisconsin

128th AC&W Squadron, Milwaukee

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and AFR units to 55. These mobilised units included 18 jet fighter squadrons, four tactical reconnaissance squadrons, eight air transport squadrons, five air weather squadrons, a tactical control group and associated ground support units.

The seven Air National Guard tactical wings and two troop carrier wings, the tactical control group, and their support units federalised on 1 October, as well as the multimission ANG F-104 squadrons called up one month later, were incorporated into the Tactical Air Command <sup>16</sup> (TAC). Between these two dates, the planning decision was made to deploy five of the ANG wing headquarters and -- of their tactical squadrons to Europe commencing on 1 November. The balance of the federalised ANG tactical fighter and reconnaissance squadrons were to remain in the CONUS under TAC control and were to train for a tactical role in any further emergency deployment required. By that time, the Air Force had recalled 29,900 Reserve personnel, the Army 119,622, and the Navy 8,357.\*

## 2. European Theater Concepts

In order to show more clearly to the Soviet Union, without fanfare, the United States' determination and ability to apply military power in the Berlin situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as early as May 1961, had under consideration several Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and TAC maneuver deployments to the European theater

\* Final call-up totals in Fiscal Year 1962 for the Air Force were: 21,000 Air National Guards and 4,900 Air Force reservists, or 3,400 officers and 22,500 airmen, for a total of 25,900.

STAIR STEP

PRIMARY FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Operating Base</u>
102 TFW		
101 TFS	F-86H	Phalsbourg, France
138 TFS	F-86H	Phalsbourg, France
131 TFS	F-86H	Phalsbourg, France
108 TFW		
141 TFS	F-84F	Chaumont, France
117 TFW		
106 TRS	RF-84F	Dreux, France
122 TFW		
163 TFS	F-84F	Chambley, France
131 TFW		
110 TFS	F-84F	Toul-Rosieres, France
121 TFW		
166 TFS	F-84F	Etain, France
151 FIS	F-104A	Ramstein, Germany
197 FIS	F-104A	Ramstein, Germany
157 FIS	F-104A	Moron, Spain

TOTAL: 11 Squadrons

SOURCE: USAF Operation Order 822-61, Appendix 1, Annex A,  
16 October 1961. (8)

**STAIR STEP**

**FOLLOW-ON DEPLOYMENT FORCE**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Operating Base</u>
108 TFW		
119 TFS	F-84F	Chammont, France
149 TFS	F-84F	Chammont, France
117 TFW		
153 TRS	RF-84F	Dreux, France
160 TRS	RF-84F	Dreux, France
184 TRS	RF-84F	Dreux, France
122 TFW		
112 TFS	F-84F	Chambley, France
113 TFS	F-84F	Chambley, France
131 TFW		
169 TFS	F-84F	Toul-Rosières, France
170 TFS	F-84F	Toul-Rosières, France
121 TFW		
162 TFS	F-84F	Etain, France
164 TFS	F-84F	Etain, France
113 TFW		
120 TFS	F-100C	Ramstein, Germany
121 TFS	F-100C	Ramstein, Germany
136 TFS	F-100C	North, Spain

**TOTAL: 14 Squadrons**

**SOURCE: USAF Operation Order 822-61, Appendix 2, Annex A,  
16 October 1961. (S)**

similar to the LONG THRUST exercise which had just been cancelled as a result of the planned meeting between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev at Vienna in June. <sup>17</sup> At the end of May, the US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) was asked by the JCS to comment upon several proposed STRAC air mobility exercises in the European area, or any similar activities by ground, naval, or air units which he considered likely to contribute significantly to deterring the Soviet Union from initiating measures inimical to the United States' presence in Berlin.

Earlier, in 1960, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Thomas D. White, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, had reached agreement on the Army's airlift needs for both limited and <sup>18</sup> general war, and on the Air Force's responsibility to meet them. This bilateral service agreement did not constitute a complete JCS position, but it was a strong factor in subsequent Continental Army Command (CONAC) and TAC air mobility exercise concepts. These concepts were reflected in subsequent LONG THRUST exercises in the European area and they recognized that, since JCS contingency plans called for the use of both strategically deployed, in-place forces, and mobile augmentation forces from the CONUS, to meet early cold war or limited war situations, it was not sufficient to plan merely for the tactical movement of the in-place forces, e.g., from Germany to North Africa. It was also essential to plan for the immediate strategic lift of the CONUS augmentation forces to overseas areas.

~~SECRET~~

Toward these ends, the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff had agreed in 1960 that enough air transportation should be available to:

a. Fly one to two reinforced STRAC battle groups with essential combat equipment to any trouble spot in the world, departing within hours of the time that the movement order was issued.

b. Within seven to ten days, increase the size of the fighting force to one division with adequate supplies, equipment, and support elements to conduct operations against the aggressor for an extended period of time.

c. Continue augmentation of these fighting forces to a two-division composition within four weeks, as required.

d. Continue augmentation of these forces, if necessary.

They had also suggested that mobility exercises should be conducted to test the Air Force and Army movement plans, and to identify obstacles to the rapid deployment of these forces. They recommended that these mobility exercises comprise at least one major deployment each year, and a number of smaller movements to overseas objective areas.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to USCINCEUR in May 1961, therefore, included: (1) an air mobility exercise of about two battle groups to Germany, and return in two or three weeks; (2) movement by air or sea, or both, of one STRAC division to Germany or Italy for one or two months.

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General Norstad's reply on 2 June, however, went considerably beyond the original Exercise LONG THRUST concepts by commenting that

~~SECRET~~

such maneuvers were feasible and had training value, but their worth in deterring undesirable Soviet actions over Berlin would depend upon their nature and timing in relation to other military measures, which might be taken by the United States to provide a more complete context for political action.<sup>20</sup> In addition to expanding on the feasibility of the various STRAC deployment exercises proposed for Europe in the second half of 1961, General Norstad suggested major bolstering actions for both the United States and the other NATO-member forces, such as:

- (1) movement of additional TAC augmentation units to the USAFE area;
- (2) movement of a naval task force, including fleet marine force units;
- (3) improved readiness for other NATO-member forces and their movement, where appropriate, to the vicinity of battle positions, and (4) an increased rate of modernization for United States and other NATO-member forces.

As noted earlier, the Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in Vienna on 3-4 June served only to increase the Berlin crisis. And this spurred an overall United States military build-up in the second half of 1961 within the framework of additional defense budget funding and the call up of Ready Reservists.

During July, General Norstad forwarded to the JCS various proposals for military actions to improve his capability to meet Berlin crisis contingencies, and he expanded upon these proposals in the following months.<sup>21</sup> General Norstad specifically recommended full manning and equipping of all United States European Command (USEUCOM) combat elements and the retention of all forces currently

assigned. He urged expedited delivery of critical weapons and equipment to his component commands: United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and United States Navy, Europe (USNAVEUR). The critical USAFE requirements cited included Mark 43 nuclear weapons to permit the storaged laydown method of delivery and GAM-83 stockage.

Eight USAFE tactical squadrons\* previously scheduled for phase out were reprogrammed for retention to assume an Army close support mission in this period and, at the end of July, the Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe (CINCSAFE), General Truman H. Landon, asked the USAF Chief of Staff for guidance relative to the proposed assignment of a conventional war mission to his command.<sup>22</sup> General Landon pointed out that certain changes and authorities would be required to achieve this capability; for example, he did not possess authority to requisition equipment and materiel in support of a conventional war mission. There would also be certain training probl. 25.

### 3. STAIR STEP Deployment Planning

In August 1961, the JCS advised USCINCEUR that augmentation of the USMCORV forces was indicated.<sup>23</sup> They directed the armed services to plan the mobilization and deployment of designated forces to Europe. Thereafter, Headquarters USAFE was heavily engaged in

\* The 47th Tactical Bombardment Wing, 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, 19th and 42d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons and their bases in the United Kingdom were all initially retained, but later US Air Force programming deleted the 47th Wing.

planning for the reception, stationing, support, and employment of various proposed mixes of TAC, AFR, and ANG augmentation forces deploying to the United Kingdom, central Europe, or elsewhere in the command's area. Generally, the units under consideration at that time comprised 24 tactical fighter squadrons, four tactical reconnaissance squadrons, two troop carrier squadrons, and one tactical control group.

The major commands concerned were informed by Headquarters USAF on 21 August that current Berlin crisis planning envisioned the island-hopping deployment in good weather of substantial Air National Guard forces to Europe during the autumn of 1961.<sup>24</sup> Priority was to be given to various actions being taken by the USAF to enhance the capability for fast deployment of large numbers of aircraft during periods of good weather. TAC and the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) were directed to inspect and validate the readiness of earmarked ANG and AFR units for deployment. USAF was authorized on 1 September to proceed with the renovation of dispersed operating base (DOB) facilities at Etain, Chambley, Chammont, Dreux and Phalsbourg in France to accommodate augmentation forces from the COMUS.<sup>25</sup>

The unclassified nickname of STAIR STEP was assigned by the JCS in September 1961 to the US European Command augmentation actions associated with the Berlin crisis.<sup>26</sup> About that same time, earlier STAIR STEP planning documents were downgraded to some degree to permit dissemination of necessary information to project

personnel,\* and Headquarters USAF subsequently adopted this code name for the tasks of readying the air reserve forces for deployment and employment in the Berlin contingency, but stipulated that it would not be used to identify actions concerning the war plan use of these forces, nor would a special precedence rating be assigned to it.

TAC special orders on 1 September ordered to extended active duty, effective 1 October 1961, six tactical fighter wings and one tactical reconnaissance wing, totaling 22 squadrons of F/RF-84 and F-86 aircraft, plus a tactical control group and a host of tactical squadron support elements, from the Air National Guard, and two troop carrier wings totaling five C-124<sup>27</sup> squadrons from the Air Force Reserve. At best, this call-up schedule would not permit deployment of these federalized units to the USAFE area until sometime in October and, after a meeting between the USAF Chief of Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay, General Norstad, and General Landen, in Paris on 2 September, it was decided that TAC regular force squadrons<sup>28</sup> would deploy to Europe in the interim. These TACK HAMMER force squadrons began deploying to the overseas area on 3 September and ultimately amounted to a temporary USAFE augmentation of six F-100 squadrons and two F-104 squadrons totaling 144 aircraft.

\* The STAIR STEP deployment of Air National Guard units to Europe, however, was apparently not downgraded from TOP Secret until 29 October 1961.

On 19 September, General LeMay advised General Landon that the Air Force was committed to be prepared to augment USCINCEUR's forces in central Europe with 28 squadrons by 31 December 1961. <sup>29</sup> Other TAC augmentation squadrons in the theater when the ANG squadrons arrived, excluding those on normal rotation, would be considered part of the six-squadron regular force augmentation if the total planned deployment of 28 squadrons took place.

By early October, the USAF concept for the 28-squadron augmentation of USCINCEUR's forces in central Europe had altered to comprise 25 ANG squadrons and three TAC regular force squadrons, with the three ANG F-104 squadrons scheduled for federalization on 1 November being substituted for three of the six TAC squadrons previously included in the total augmentation force and already in the overseas area. <sup>30</sup> The JCS had been advised that the decision to deploy an initial ANG increment, or primary force, must be made not later than 15 October to permit commencement of the movement overseas by 1 November.

The STAIR STEP deployment concept was later changed to provide for a primary force composed of five ANG tactical fighter wings with seven squadrons, one tactical reconnaissance wing with one squadron, three fighter-interceptor squadrons, and one tactical control group with two <sup>31</sup> Aircraft Control & Warning (AC&W) squadrons and three AC&W flights. A follow-on force of one ANG tactical fighter wing and 14 squadrons was to be retained in the COMUS under TAC with the objective of developing a capability to deploy anywhere in the world as required.

Six of the TAC augmentation squadrons already in the USAFE area were to return to the COMUS upon the arrival of the ANG forces.

Headquarters USAFE planning actions based on USAF guidance had been in progress as early as 1 August 1961.<sup>32</sup> These actions encompassed a multitude of equipment, materiel, training, and support requirements, and included COMUS visits by key command personnel to coordinate the STAIR STEP planning with TAC and the ANG. Appropriate programming plans were published by Headquarters USAFE and the Seventeenth Air Force in October and revised as necessary thereafter.<sup>33</sup>

These plans noted that augmentation of the USAFE forces with TAC and ANG units was being envisaged to meet the current DOD contingency planning emphasis upon conventional weapons, while continuing the normal Atomic Strike Plan requirements of the Seventeenth Air Force's assigned strike units.<sup>34</sup> This USAF planning had been unilateral, but compatible with NATO and tripartite (France, Great Britain and United States) military planning. This fact, and the possibility of the current crisis escalating to a general war situation, would have to be taken into consideration by any augmentation force deploying to the USAFE area. Moreover, retention of the command's regular tactical forces through the USAFE Weapons Center at Wheelus Air Base in Libya was to be curtailed to beef up the ready combat aircraft strength in central Europe, and to speed the Weapons Center phase of the USAFE F-105D conversion program.

The initial Seventeenth Air Force STAIR STEP plan assumed that the normal USAFE requirement to deploy regular force tactical squadrons

to the DOB's in France for exercise and emergency purposes would cease, and the subcommand would be relieved of the USAF requirement to support TAC additive forces at its bases, for the duration of the ANG deployment.<sup>35</sup> However, a revised subcommand STAIR STEP plan issued at the end of October deleted these assumptions.

As it turned out, the STAIR STEP primary force deployment to the USAFE area was executed much more rapidly than originally planned, and there were several important last minute changes.<sup>36</sup> CINCSAFE was notified on 11 October 1961 of the President's decision to deploy to Europe 11 federalized ANG squadrons and a tactical control group starting 1 November, and to return to the CONUS seven of the eight TAC HAMMER squadrons deployed to Europe earlier.<sup>37</sup> The ANG aerial deployment schedule was confirmed by Headquarters USAF on 13 October as beginning on 1 November and ending on 8 December.<sup>38</sup> Surface movement was to start on 5 November and close by 31 December 1961.

The Air National Guard unit advance parties began arriving at the USAFE bases in France on 18-19 October, and on the latter date, Headquarters USAF compressed the schedule for the mass aerial deployment of the STAIR STEP tactical aircraft to launch on 27 October and close at the overseas bases as soon as possible.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, the first STAIR STEP tactical aircraft reached the overseas station on 2 November and the last arrived weeks ahead of the original schedule.

The three recalled ANG F-104 squadrons included in the STAIR STEP primary force encountered various flight safety, equipping and training problems.<sup>40</sup> It was decided that these units and their Starfighter

aircraft would be airlifted to the overseas theater by MATS. In a further change, one of these F-104 squadrons earmarked for Berlin air corridor escort duty, if this became necessary, was finally assigned to the 65th Air Division (Defense) at Moron Air Base in Spain.

#### 4. Follow-On Force Planning

Headquarters USAF guidance prior to the STAIR STEP primary force deployment to Europe in 1961 had stipulated that USAFE must also be prepared to accept and employ the 17 federalized Air National Guard and Tactical Air Command squadrons comprising the follow-on force within 15 days of deployment notification. <sup>41</sup> Headquarters USAFE planning actions, dispersed operating base rehabilitations, material and consumables stockage, and negotiations with appropriate host nations and NATO armed forces were still continuing at the end of 1961. In general, USAFE planned to station two follow-on F-84F squadrons each at Chambley, Chaumont, Etain, and Toul-Rosières in France; two additional F-100C squadrons at Ramstein in Germany; and one F-100C squadron each at Spangdahlem and Hahn in Germany, Aviano in Italy, and Lakenheath in England. Also, one of the primary force F-104 units currently at Ramstein was scheduled to move to Bitburg in Germany.

Command preparations for possible follow-on force deployment were given further impetus by a directive from General LeMay during a visit to the USAFE area in early November 1961 that plans be developed for the utilization of any and all available landing strips

which could accommodate USAF aircraft for dispersal or reinforcement purposes in the event of a large-scale conventional war.<sup>42</sup> General LeMay further directed CINCUSAFE to prepare a plan for deploying and employing the additional, non-STAIR STEP Air National Guard squadrons federalized on 1 October, all other TAG-oriented ANG squadrons, and all of Tactical Air Command's squadrons, in the event of a large-scale conventional war in which all of these forces might be made available to the USAFE.

Accordingly, the preparation of USAFE main and dispersed operating bases to receive STAIR STEP follow-on forces was given maximum command emphasis in the final months of 1961.<sup>43</sup> A joint USAF and British Royal Air Force (RAF) team, for example, surveyed five RAF stations in West Germany as possible forward operating locations (FOL's) for the federalized ANG F-84-F squadrons based in France.<sup>44</sup> The team determined that one squadron of 18 aircraft could be accommodated immediately at Geilenkirchen, and one squadron each at Wildenrath and Bruggen when airfield construction work was completed sometime in 1962.<sup>45</sup> Meanwhile, a USAFE deployment and dispersal outline study submitted to Headquarters USAF toward the end of November 1961 was characterized by the USAF Vice Chief of Staff as "a step in the right direction" toward command preparedness to receive additional augmentation forces.<sup>46</sup> He added that further guidance and approval of the necessary implementing actions would be assigned a high priority by Headquarters USAF.

In a letter to General Landen following his visit in November, General LeMay stated that the Air Staff did not intend to introduce

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the STAIR STEP augmentation forces into NATO channels as a force committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.<sup>47</sup> Since these forces had been deployed to meet unilateral and tripartite contingency plan requirements, the USAF wanted to retain the prerogative of withdrawing them if the situation permitted.

In his reply, General Landon noted that the absence of a NATO commitment for the STAIR STEP units had given rise to some concern among the NATO nations, and presented an obstacle to negotiations for base utilisation, air traffic control, and force deployment and employment.<sup>48</sup>

By the end of 1961, it appeared highly probable that most of the federalised Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units would be returned to reserve status during 1962.

#### 5. Negotiations With Host Nations

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) was briefed on the United States' plans to augment its forces in Europe by the US Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, on 8 August 1961.<sup>49</sup> Secretary Rusk explained that the United States had an urgent need for host nation assistance in providing the necessary facilities to support the deployment to central Europe by 1 January 1962, if this became necessary, up to six additional Army divisions and 28 tactical air squadrons, together with two air transport squadrons.

In the detailed negotiations with the appropriate host nations for force deployment clearances and expanded facility utilisation agreements which preceded the US European Command augmentation in

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the autumn of 1961, for the most part, the European governments displayed a sincere desire to cooperate. France, in September, readily agreed to increased US Armed Forces utilization of her bases and harbors, but there was no change in the prohibition of United States nuclear weapon storage on French soil.<sup>50</sup> This prohibition had spurred USCINCEUR to order the evacuation of USAF strike aircraft from their French bases in 1959. Also, a problem later arose with respect to STAIR STEP reconnaissance aircraft operations from Dreux Air Base.

The existing saturation of military real estate posed the major negotiations problem in West Germany.<sup>51</sup> Matters for negotiation with the British Government included the proposed stationing of a STAIR STEP follow-on force F-100C squadron at RAF Station Lakenheath, and the USAF need for forward operating locations in the Royal Air Force's operating area in West Germany.<sup>52</sup>

#### The Dreux Air Base Impasse

The proposed utilization of air bases in France by STAIR STEP squadrons was outlined to French officials at Paris on 12 September 1961, and was approved by the French Government shortly thereafter.<sup>53</sup> Involved, at that time, were 19 tactical and air transport squadrons, requiring the reactivation or improvement of USAF bases at Chambley, Chaumont, Dreux, Etain, Laon, Toul-Rosières, and Phalsbourg, plus possible use of the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) base at Chateauroux. A revised STAIR STEP deployment program had to be presented to the French on 26 September, however, which deleted the

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previously proposed air transport operations at either Chateauroux or Dreux and substituted requirements for four tactical reconnaissance squadrons at Dreux; one primary force squadron and three follow-on force squadrons.

The American authorities were informed by the French on 23 October that the Ministry of Defense was withholding concurrence in the proposed jet squadron deployment to Dreux, pending further study, because these operations would create serious air traffic control problems in the nearby Paris terminal zone.<sup>54</sup> In a meeting with French officials the following day, USAF air traffic control (ATC) specialists contended that acceptable air traffic control procedures could be developed for jet flying operations from Dreux Air Base, and the French Chief Controller, Paris ATC, agreed.<sup>55</sup> However, the official French position remained unchanged.

In reply to a formal request by General Norstad on 28 October, the French Ministry of Defense authorized the STAIR STEP primary force reconnaissance squadron to land at Dreux, but with the firm understanding that the RF-84F aircraft would not operate from Dreux until the French had made a final decision, and the French Government would probably not agree to the permanent stationing of a jet squadron at Dreux. Since the federalized ANG 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) Headquarters elements and the 106th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) destined for Dreux had already departed home station, the USAF decided to proceed with this deployment.

Prior to governmental level negotiations on the Dreux jet flying clearance problem, USGINGEUR directed CINCUSAFE to consider alternative bases in central Europe.<sup>56</sup> The French suggested the former USAFE dispersed operating base at Brienne-le-Chateau, but USEUCOM replied that USAREUR units squeezed out of Etain Air Base by STAIR STEP units had been relocated to Brienne at considerable expense. Close scrutiny of other possible bases for the STAIR STEP reconnaissance aircraft by USAFE during November 1961 did not reveal a ready solution.

With French approval, the 106th TRS flew six RF-84F's to Chaumont Air Base and resumed flying training on a temporary duty basis effective 20 November.<sup>57</sup> Meanwhile, complaints from some of the immobilized Alabama ANG personnel reaching the COMUS about the held up in flying operations and low morale caused a furor in November. Deeply concerned, General LeMay, early in December, directed TDY of the entire tactical squadron to Chaumont, the preparation of plans for relocating these STAIR STEP elements, and a vigorous internal information program at Dreux.<sup>58</sup>

The 106th TRS was stationed at Chaumont on a TDY basis on 4 December, and this became a permanent change of station in January 1962, but the Air Staff approved a CINCUSAFE recommendation that the other 117th TFW elements remain at Dreux Air Base.<sup>59</sup> Subsequent negotiations failed to achieve French clearance for jet flying operations at Dreux Air Base, and there were plans at one time to move the STAIR STEP augmentation reconnaissance force to Bruntingthorpe,

but the 117th TRW headquarters and support units remained at Dreux, and the 106th TRS at Chamont, until their redeployment to the COMUS in mid-1962.

### C. AUGMENTATION FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

#### 1. TACK HAMMER-CHECK MATE

Following a meeting between Generals Norstad, LeMay and Landon at Paris, three days earlier, to discuss the United States military buildup in Europe, the Tactical Air Command was directed by Headquarters USAF, on 5 September 1961, to immediately augment the USAF with TACK HAMMER<sup>60</sup> forces. The initial increment of these forces, comprising four F-100D squadrons with 72 aircraft, was launched from the COMUS that same day. The Super Sabres flew the southern route and were refueled by TAC and USAF tankers in the vicinities of Kindley Air Force Base, Bermuda; Lajes Air Base in the Azores, and Chateauroux Air Station in central France. Thirteen of the F-100's aborted at enroute bases for various reasons, but the lead TACK HAMMER elements touched down at their designated bases in France and Germany during the afternoon of 5 September. All 72 aircraft had arrived at their overseas bases by 7 September.

As noted earlier,\* some TAC regular force squadrons had been earmarked for inclusion in the overall STAIR STEP augmentation of the USAF in the original plans for this augmentation, but these squadrons were later replaced for STAIR STEP primary force deployment purposes

\* See p. 12, this Study.

by mobilized Air National Guard units. The TACK HAMMER deployment to Europe, therefore, was an interim measure pending overseas movement of the newly federalized ANG squadrons. The mission of these forces, however, was publicly announced by the USAF as being to participate in NATO's Exercise CHECK MATE during the period 12-14 September 1961.<sup>61</sup>

A second interim TACK HAMMER augmentation element of two F-100D and two F-104C squadrons was subsequently launched by TAC from the United States to USAFE bases in central Europe and to SAC's Meron Air Base in Spain.\* Also, during September, TAC deployed two squadrons of F-100's, six RF-101's, six RB-66's, and 32 C-130's to United Kingdom bases in connection with Exercise CHECK MATE.<sup>62</sup> The latter two F-100 squadrons, totaling 36 aircraft, moved overseas under the unclassified code name of Operation SCRAP IRON, with Exercise CHECK MATE once again being used as a cover for the temporary positioning of one of these squadrons at Aviano Air Base in Italy, and the other at the NATO base at Larissa, Greece.\*\*

Arrival of the TACK HAMMER units in Europe during September aroused considerable public and news media interest; particularly,

\* Initially stationed at Meron with an air defense mission, the 435th Tactical Fighter Squadron was moved later in September to Bitburg Air Base in Germany for a Berlin air corridor escort mission.

\*\* The original SCRAP IRON plan apparently called for relief of the regular TAC rotational squadron at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey by the squadron at Larissa, but this was not implemented.

with respect to the return of USAF tactical aircraft to the bases<sup>63</sup> in France after the RED RICHARD exodus of 1959-1960. USAF tactical wings had been withdrawn and their former stations in France reduced to USAF dispersed operating base status because of continued French refusal to sanction United States atomic warheads in that country, and there was no change in this prohibition. The DOD later authorized a USAF announcement that six TAC F-100 and two F-104 squadrons would be retained temporarily in the USAF area for operational training.

The end position of the TACK HAMMER augmentation of the USAF in central Europe in September 1961 pending arrival of the STAIR STEP<sup>64</sup> primary force was as follows:

Unit	Base	Aircraft
309th TFS*	Spangdahlem, Germany	18 F-100D's
355th TFS	Hahn, Germany ✓	18 F-100D's
429th TFS	Chambley, France ✓	18 F-100D's
430th TFS	Moron, Spain	18 F-100D's
434th TFS	Bitburg, Germany	18 F-104C's
435th TFS	Ramstein, Germany ✓	18 F-100C's
523rd TFS	Chambley, France ✓	18 F-100D's
614th TFS	Ramstein, Germany	18 F-100D's

Total Aircraft . . 144

Operational control of the TACK HAMMER augmentation squadrons was delegated to Seventeenth Air Force, except for the squadron stationed at Moron Air Base under USAF's 65th Air Division (Defense), and they assumed normal, non-nuclear, alert commitments immediately upon arrival in Europe. Relieved of all operational commitments

\* Replaced the 613th Tactical Fighter Squadron originally launched to Spangdahlem.

72 hours prior to departure,\* seven of the TACK HAMMER squadrons began redeploying to home stations in the final two weeks of November and the last aircraft reached the CONUS by 13 December 1961. The eighth TAC HAMMER unit, the 435th Tactical Fighter Squadron equipped with F-104C's, remained at Ramstein Air Base.

## 2. The STAIR STEP Deployment

Detailed guidance for the mobilization, training, equipping, and overseas deployment of Air National Guard units was contained in TAC's Operation Plan 71.<sup>65</sup> A USAF operation order\*\* was issued on 16 October in support of the TAC plan. This document constituted a warning directive for immediate planning purposes, and it prescribed the subordinate unit tasks in controlling the deployment of tactical air augmentation forces to the USAF area of responsibility.

The ANG tactical wings federalized and assigned to TAC on 1 October had begun improved operational readiness manning, equipping, and training actions immediately upon their designation in August as priority units for recall.<sup>66</sup> TAC directives on 14 August and 23 August increased the training requirements for all of these units, and revised their operational readiness criteria to increase the conventional weapons delivery demands for the tactical fighter wings. The appropriate National Guard Bureaus increased flying hour allocations for the

\* USAF's 49th and 50th Tactical Fighter Wings assumed these commitments until the STAIR STEP squadrons were operationally ready.

\*\* USAF Operation Order 822-61, 16 October 1961. (S)

second quarter of Fiscal Year 1962 as necessary. By mid-September, the Air National Guard tactical training was being oriented toward deployment overseas.

The designated ANG wings were provided with continuous assistance and guidance by TAC. <sup>67</sup> All aircrews scheduled for overseas flight were given intensive training in long-range navigation, over water procedures, cold climate survival, and instrument flying. The pilots averaged three sorties of 1,000 nautical miles (NM) or more patterned as closely as possible after the actual leg distances and navigational aids of the routes to be flown, with emphasis upon full-stop ground controlled approach (GCA) landings. The USAF conducted operational readiness inspections (ORI) of the deploying ANG units in the final weeks of October.

TAC Operation Plan 71 had apparently provided for a launch date of as late as 1 December 1961, but Headquarters USAF later set the STAIR STEP primary force departure at 1 November. <sup>68</sup> Advance party personnel of the deploying units began arriving at the overseas bases on 19 October, and one week later, on 26 October, TAC ordered the tactical aircraft launch. By the following day, the largest single overseas transfer of a USAF tactical aircraft force since World War II was underway.

The seven tactical fighter squadrons and one tactical reconnaissance squadron of the STAIR STEP primary force (See Figure 2) involved in this overseas flight comprised 104 F-84F's, 20 RF-84F's, 78 F-86H's, 16 T-33's, and 6 C-47's. Nine route options had been established in

the planning for this overseas movement, but the STAIR STEP force launched on 27-28 and 29 October used only three of these possible routes to Europe:

Harmen, Newfoundland; Lajes, Azores; Moron, Spain, and thence to central Europe.

Argentina, Newfoundland; Lajes, Azores; Moron, Spain, and thence to central Europe.

Loring, Maine; Goose Bay, Labrador; Sondrestrom, Greenland; Keflavik, Iceland; Prestwick, Scotland, and thence to central Europe.

Only the 102d Tactical Fighter Wing's three F-86H squadrons used the Loring to Prestwick, northern, deployment route. All of the routes placed greatest dependence on island hopping, rather than air refueling.<sup>69</sup> Should air refueling be required, it was to be carried out in daylight.

Air Force Reserve personnel recalled for 60 days flew 10 SA-16B air rescue aircraft posted at Eglin, Goose Bay, and Prestwick for this deployment.<sup>70</sup> TAC,\* Strategic Air Command (SAC), Air Defense Command (ADC), and the US Coast Guard provided radio relay, weather services, and air refueling capability along the routes. Movement control teams were also provided by TAC at the staging and enroute bases, while the STAIR STEP units furnished their own enroute maintenance teams. All of these commands and agencies combined to thoroughly brief the ANG aircrews prior to each leg of the overseas flight.

\* Including a federalized Air National Guard C-97 TALKING BIRD flying command post with General Walter C. Sweeney, the TAC commander, on board to personally monitor the deployment in its initial phases.

The 117th TRW's 106th TRS launched 20 RF-84F's from Birmingham, Alabama, on the morning of 27 October, staged at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey, and moved overseas via Argentina, Lajes, and Moron. Sixteen of the Thunderflashes landed at Dreux Air Base on 3 November, and the remaining four, delayed by air aborts and weather, closed in at the overseas station on 9 November.

The 121st TFW's 166th TFS from Columbus, Ohio; the 122d TFW's 163d TFS from Fort Wayne, Indiana, and the 131st TFW's 110th TFS from St. Louis, Missouri, launched their F-84F's on 28 October, staged through McGuire, and flew the Harmon-Lajes-Moron southern route, as did the 108th TFW's 141st TFS Thunderstreaks launched the following day from their home station at McGuire. All 26 of the 166th TFS F-84F's closed in at Etain Air Base during the afternoon of 8 November,\* while the last of the 110th TFS Thunderstreaks completed their approximately 4500 NM flight to Toul-Rosières Air Base on 13 November. The lead 141st TFS F-84F's touched down at Chaumont Air Base on 3 November, and the last, held up by headwinds at Harmon, on 6 November.

The 102d TFW launched its 101st, 131st, and 138th TFS with a total of 78 F-86H's on 28 October from Boston, Massachusetts, directly to Loring, and thence via the northern route. All of the Sabrejets had landed at Phalsbourg Air Base by 5 November 1961.

\* The 166th was the only STAIR STEP primary force F-84F squadron recovering its aircraft at the overseas station as originally scheduled.



Brigadier General Charles W. Sweeny, Commander, 102d Tactical Fighter Wing (ANG), is greeted at Phalsbourg, November 1961

Fig 6

102d Tactical Fighter Wing F-86's arrive at Phalabourg, November 1961.



In summary, the federalized ANG STAIR STEP primary force flew 228 jet fighter, reconnaissance, and trainer aircraft, plus six C-47 support airplanes, to the USAF area less than 30 days after recall to active duty, without the loss of a single plane and without a single accident. There were a moderate number of ground and air aborts along the routes, but all of the tactical aircraft were at their overseas stations by 13 November. Headwinds on the Harmon to Lajes leg were the biggest single delaying factor. Two F-84F's beyond the point of no return on this leg when the recall was sounded at Harmon on 2 November successfully accomplished air refueling to reach Lajes, although the pilots had no prior air refueling experience. Sabrejets encountering 45 knot headwinds instead of predicted 40 knot tailwinds enroute to Lajes that same day called on a C-135 to seek out the best flying altitude, and landed at the island base with a minimum of 100 pounds of fuel.

The USAF Chief of Staff visited Harmon Air Force Base during the afternoon of 2 November and remarked to the STAIR STEP pilots that "the USAF was bending over backwards on safety," and he was certain the force would be launched from Harmon the following day. Aircrews taking off for Lajes on 3 November said, not altogether facetiously, that General LeMay had "ordered favorable winds."

The deployment recall signal, MONA LISA, was compromised, and TAC substituted YULE TREE. <sup>72</sup> Some of the STAIR STEP pilots believed that the Soviet trawler fleet in the Atlantic may have been responsible for erroneous navigational signals which they

had received from surface radio while in flight, and ignored when requested verification was not forthcoming.<sup>73</sup> In any case, the elaborate USAF Communications precautions had anticipated this possibility. There were some complaints of equipment shortages, but no major enroute facility problems. SAC expressed some concern about the possible impact of bad weather upon the STAIR STEP aircraft turn<sup>74</sup>arounds at Meron Air Base.

MATS airlift support of this overseas deployment entailed an estimated 371 trips from 23 onload points in 10 states to carry 9,800 STAIR STEP headquarters and support unit passengers and 2,400 tons of cargo.<sup>75</sup> An additional 10,000 tons of STAIR STEP cargo was scheduled for sealift. Most of the surface tonnage was unit equipment for the 2200-man 152d Tactical Control Group flown to Germany by MATS between 27 October and 14 November and destined for stations at eight locations within the Federal Republic of Germany, as follows:<sup>76</sup>

Unit	Location
Hq 152d Tactical Control Group	Mannheim, Germany
106th Tactical Control Squadron	Mannheim, Germany
101st AC&W Flight	Gelsheim, Germany
102d AC&W Squadron	Celle,* Germany
103d AC&W Squadron	Rethwesten, Germany
108th AC&W Flight	Hamm,** Germany
112th AC&W Flight	Beuchel, Germany
123d AC&W Squadron	Landsküt, Germany
Tactical Direction Post	Mausdorf, Germany

The USAF had planned to fly the three federalized ANG fighter-interceptor squadrons of the STAIR STEP primary force (the 151st,

\* Not operational in 1961 pending negotiations with the British Royal Air Force in Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany.

\*\* Proposed operating site; the unit was stationed at Sembach Air Base in 1961 pending further host nation and military negotiations.

157th and 197th squadrons recalled on 1 November and reorganized as augmented fighter-interceptor squadrons) to Europe, but mechanical troubles with the unit F-104A/B aircraft made this appear unwise.

<sup>77</sup> MATS began airlifting these personnel and their partially disassembled Starfighters to the USAFE area on 10 November under a project called BRASS RING. Delivery of the 60 F-104's to Ramstein in Germany and Moron in Spain was completed by MATS on 12 December. All of these aircraft had been reassembled by San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SAAMA)-Air Force Logistics Command teams assisted by military personnel and test flown by the end of the year, to bring to a close the overseas deployment phase of the STAIR STEP primary force's operations in 1961.

#### D. THEATER OPERATIONS

##### 1. Command and Control

Command and operational control of all STAIR STEP primary force units deployed to Europe in 1961 was assumed by CINCSAFE as they crossed 10 degrees West longitude. <sup>78</sup> These augmentation tactical and support units were integrated into the Seventeenth Air Force control structure\* in order that they might be responsive to Allied Command Europe in the event of a NATO war. <sup>79</sup> The Seventeenth Air Force control structure was modified as necessary to accommodate the concept of employing STAIR STEP primary force units in a conventional role under less than general war conditions in central Europe.

\* Except the 157th Tactical Fighter Squadron, assigned to the 65th Air Division (Defense) for an air defense role in Spain.

At the same time, the Air Staff in 1961 sought to avoid formal commitment of the STAIR STEP forces to the NATO, because the USAF wanted to retain the prerogative of withdrawing those forces from Europe if the situation permitted.<sup>80</sup> The role of the USAF augmentation units in NATO, non-NATO and routine training operations was questioned by both the British and German air forces in November 1961, in connection with joint surveys of their bases in West Germany to determine the availability of forward operating locations for the STAIR STEP tactical squadrons based in France, and of operating sites for the 152d Tactical Control Group.<sup>81</sup> It appeared that further USAF progress in these programs depended to some extent upon British and West German agreement to the United States concepts for the employment of the STAIR STEP primary force.

The United States position was clarified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1961, to the effect that the augmentation forces deployed to Europe to meet the requirements of unilateral and/or tripartite (United States, United Kingdom and France) planning would be assigned to the operational command of USCINCEUR, and further assigned to SACEUR, on the same basis as other USAF and USAREUR units.<sup>82</sup> However, this assignment of augmentation forces to SACEUR while they were stationed within the US European Command in no way implied that the United States commitment of these units to NATO was a permanent arrangement.

**STAIR STEP CROSS-TRAINING PROGRAM**  
**NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1961**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Airmen Currently Assigned</u>	<u>Total to Cross-Train</u>	<u>Total to Cross-Train Into Category "A"</u>
102 TFW	Phalsbourg France	1,861	205	53
7121 TW	Etain, France	930	165	42
7122 TW	Chambley, France	935	107	31
7108 TW	Chaumont, France	949	18	6
7131 TW	Toul-Rosieres France	576	108	59
7117 TW	Dreux, France	977	125	33
152 TCG	Mannheim Germany	1,860	251	93
151 FIS	Ramstein Germany	415	85	61
197 FIS	Ramstein Germany	398	45	33
157 FIS	Moron, Spain	370	89	57
	TOTALS	9,271	1,198*	468**

\* This was approximately 16 percent of the total Air National Guard airmen strength deployed.

\*\* Category "A" skills, which normally require basic technical training from the Air Training Command, were reduced to equipment centered training.

SOURCE: History, USAFE, DCS/Personnel, July-December 1961. (SECRET)

PRIMARY FORCE STAIR STEP UNIT  
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS  
1962

UNIT	OFFICERS		AIRMEN	
	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
102d TFW	228	258	1,827	1,839
7108th TW	132	124	1,135	952
7117th TW	133	126	1,122	975
7121th TW	130	123	1,125	920
7122d TW	131	123	1,127	946
7131st TW	87	76	603	570
152d TGG	261	215	1,983	1,838
TOTALS	1,102	1,045	8,917	7,940

SOURCE: History, Seventeenth Air Force, January-June 1962. (SECRET)

## 2. Organization and Manning

The organizational philosophy of the STAIR STEP primary force deployment to the USAFE area stipulated that the federalized ANG units were to move overseas fully equipped and manned to operate the five USAFE dispersed operating bases at Etain, Chambley, Chaumont, Dreux, and Phalsbourg, all in France, with a 30-day support capability, and without dependents.<sup>83</sup> The DOB's were reactivated as USAFE main operating bases (MOB), with the ANG wing commanders assuming command of these bases and operational command of any house-keeping personnel already there.\* The recalled ANG tactical wing support units generally accompanied the overseas portion of the wing headquarters,\*\* except for the 131st Tactical Fighter Wing.<sup>84</sup> Moving overseas to a USAFE main operating base at Toul-Rosieres in France, the 131st deployed only its aircraft maintenance squadron for support purposes.

The major organizational problems of the STAIR STEP primary force units deployed to Europe in 1961 stemmed from the fact that the Air National Guard mobility planning was designed to cope with the deployment of these reserve force units from the ANG operating location to another active base, while the actual deployment required the movement of these units overseas to bases that had been inactive only a short time before and were not completely ready to receive them.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, unit integrity was not always maintained.

\* Previously a 7544th Support Group (USAFE) responsibility.

\*\* For STAIR STEP primary force unit composition, strengths, and base facilities, see Annex I, this study.

The 138th TFS, for instance, was transferred from the 107th Tactical Fighter Wing at Syracuse, New York, to the 102d TFW just prior to the overseas flight of the entire 102d Wing.

The ANG unit manning documents (UMD) under which all of the STAIR STEP units were recalled to active duty did not meet the manning requirements in the European theater.<sup>86</sup> This necessitated several UMD changes for these units which resulted in Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) shortages and overages, and led to extensive cross-training requirements in all units. About 3,000 filler personnel were recalled by the Air Force Reserve Records Center under the original ANG UMD's and there were many airmen in AFSC's which were no longer required. The more important gaps between ANG UMD's and theater needs included such areas as commercial transportation, procurement, maintenance management, liquid oxygen plant operators, and air police. In summary, the wide variations in the make up of the overseas contingents organized by each of the six deploying tactical wings, and the revisions of the UMD's after federalization,\* vastly increased the unit personnel retraining and reassignment burdens and caused a lag in bringing the overseas wing elements up to full and effective manning strengths.

At TAC's behest, the wing headquarters staffs of the 108th, 121st, 122d, and 131st Tactical Fighter Wings, and of the 117th

\* For example, the 157th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron unit manning document was changed from an original 437 personnel to 388, then to 288, and finally to 240, while the Unit Equipment List of this organization normally required 750 men to operate.

Reconnaissance Wings,\* were split between CONUS and overseas elements just prior to the deployment of the designated tactical squadrons and support units of these wings. <sup>87</sup> Some 17 officers and 49 airmen were withdrawn from each wing headquarters to man the CONUS element. Overseas wing staff personnel were not happy about the division of trained people, and prior USAF manning documents tailored to the situation existing at the base to which each federalized ANG wing was to be deployed soon revealed serious shortages.\*\*

Headquarters USAF had concurred in the TAC proposal to split the recalled ANG wing headquarters deploying with the STAIR STEP primary force because these wings did not deploy in their entirety and retention of a control element in TAC was deemed necessary. <sup>88</sup> Since it was impossible to assign part of the wing headquarters to USAF and another part to TAC, the Air Staff proposed to attach, rather than assign, the five ANG wings concerned to CINCSAFE. <sup>89</sup>

This proposal was resisted by CINCSAFE, due to the impact that the attached status of these units would have on his control of the augmentation force. Late in November, Headquarters USAF authorized CINCSAFE to designate and organize the five STAIR STEP primary force tactical wings with only one squadron deployed as nonconstituted

Subsequently redesignated as the 7108th, 7121st, 7122d, 7131st and 7117th Tactical Wings (USAF).

See Section G, The Lessons Learned, this study.

units, and to add a seven prefix to their original designations, as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective Date</u>	<u>Location</u>
7108th TFW	11 November 1961	Chaumont AB
7121st TFW	24 November 1961	Stain AB
7122nd TFW	7 November 1961	Chambley AB
7131st TFW	24 November 1961	Toul AB
7117th TFW	11 November 1961	Dreux AB

### 3. Mission Concepts

For most of the decade preceding 1961, the USAFE combat forces were progressively oriented toward the employment of tactical nuclear weapons as a contribution to the massive retaliation strategy of the Eisenhower Administration.<sup>91</sup> By 1961, the command's diminished resources did not permit more than very limited conventional weapons stockage and delivery training. Likewise, the dispersed operating bases in France had been reduced to a point where they were scheduled for only six wartime sorties, due both to economy factors and to the French prohibition of United States nuclear warhead storage in that country.

Thus, the Kennedy Administration's conventional war concepts,\* which inspired the STAIR STEP augmentation of the USAFE in the autumn of 1961, required a major reorientation of the command's resources and efforts.<sup>92</sup> The Army close support and conventional strike missions were not new to the USAFE, and there could be no relaxation of the nuclear strike posture of the regularly assigned strike force, but the conventional war concepts, training, and stockage had to be largely

\* See pp. 1 - 3, this study.

reconstituted to encompass the combat missions of the recalled Air National Guard units deployed to Europe.

The essential purpose of the STAIR STEP primary force deployment to the USAFE area in 1961 was to provide an additional conventional weapons capability for employment in any Berlin contingency or limited war, without degrading the current Atomic Strike Plan commitment of the regularly assigned intheater forces.<sup>93</sup> Since all of the STAIR STEP strike squadrons had been trained for nuclear weapons delivery, considerable retraining was inherent in the decision to prepare them for a conventional role.

The mission concepts established by CINCUSAFE for the STAIR STEP tactical wings integrated them into SACEUR's Automatic Strike Program (ASP) for general war purposes, but with conventional weapons.<sup>94</sup> The augmentation squadrons were also assigned a strike role in the USAFE contingency plans for Berlin, and counter-air and air-to-air missions within the framework of the command's general war and Berlin access plans. In addition, they had the mission of providing "on-call" close air support to the Seventh US Army in Europe.

The emergency war plan strike role assigned to the STAIR STEP tactical fighter and reconnaissance squadrons comprised nine Category A and five Category B targets.<sup>95</sup> These were very high priority conventional targets, largely in the Soviet satellite countries. The general objective of this targeting program was to cover road, rail, and water transportation systems, control centers, and airdromes in the satellite area not covered by SACEUR's nuclear strike program.

Specifically for Berlin contingency purposes, the federalized ANG fighter squadrons, including the F-104 units at Ramstein Air Base, were designated for: (a) normal USAFE alert commitments; (b) Berlin air corridor "on-call" or transport escort duty, and (c) limited war operations both inside and outside the air corridors. In the latter situation, it was assumed that the STAIR STEP primary force would be bolstered by additional federalized ANG or TAC regular forces.

The fighter squadrons of the STAIR STEP primary force were scheduled by CINCUSAFE for an appropriate alert status with operational weapons in central Europe as soon as mandatory theater orientation briefings and indoctrination had been accomplished. By 31 December 1961, only 60 days after recall to active duty in the United States, all STAIR STEP strike squadrons were to be assigned specific targets in the satellite countries and standing the normal USAFE conventional alerts within a few minutes flying time from the Iron Curtain. The federalized ANG F-104 squadrons at Ramstein, earmarked for corridor escort duty, were to stand a 15-minute alert.

#### 4. Theater Training

Within the framework of the foregoing mission concepts, the CINCUSAFE's paramount training objective for the STAIR STEP tactical fighter squadrons during the final months of 1961 was to achieve certification of the aircrews as operationally ready (O/R) for their conventional weapons strike missions, and, thereafter, to maintain the conventional weapons qualification of these aircrews. The

Seventeenth Air Force was also required to train the F-84F squadrons for nuclear delivery proficiency simultaneously with the non-nuclear training, but the conventional weapons readiness was to have priority.

Before the STAIR STEP primary force tactical units could be integrated into the theater readiness program, the USAFE had to provide training in essentially three stages: (a) orientation and indoctrination of these personnel in central European operating procedures and conditions; (b) continued proficiency flying in air-to-air tactics, qualification training in weapons delivery methods, and photo reconnaissance, and (c) incorporation of this force into the USAFE emergency plans for both general war and lesser contingencies. Although conventional training was emphasized in the latter two stages of the program, many of the STAIR STEP pilots were nuclear trained when they arrived in Europe, and provisions were made for maintaining this proficiency.

For theater orientation and indoctrination purposes, specialized briefing and instructor teams drawn from USAFE regular force wings met the STAIR STEP tactical units upon arrival in Europe. Generally over a two week period, these teams briefed the recalled ANG personnel on European operating procedures, navigational aids, weather, governmental and political borders, enemy order of battle data, and so forth, and guided them through a minimum of three theater orientation sorties. Additional guidance was provided during this period by a continuous stream of staff assistance teams from Headquarters USAFE and the Seventeenth Air Force.

Upon completion of their orientation rides, the STAIR STEP tactical pilots began normal TAC Manual 51-8, instrument, low level and formation navigation, and other operational readiness training, with emphasis upon dive and skip bombing, and low level strafing, at the Suippes and Siegenberg ranges in Europe and the USAF Weapons Center in North Africa. Utilization of the European ranges in the winter months was severely limited by bad weather. The 7102d TFW's F-86H squadrons began rotating increments of 12 aircraft and 13 aircrews through the Wheelus ranges in Libya on 21 November 1961, and were followed by the F-84F squadrons in January 1962. The 7117th TW's F-84F's, flying from Chaumont, accomplished their training in Europe. The recalled ANG F-104 units were also rotated through Wheelus early in 1962, to make sure that each Starfighter pilot had actually fired at least one GAR-8 missile.

A separate flying hour program was developed for the STAIR STEP units for second quarter Fiscal Year (FY) 1962 which included the deployment flying time. <sup>98</sup> The balance of this program allocated 15 hours per month for each ready aircrew; however, in recognition of the theater indoctrination demands, these crews were scheduled to fly one half of the program during the first week of theater operations; two thirds the second week, and the full program thereafter. The actual STAIR STEP squadron flying hours after arrival in the USAF area are indicated on Figures 9 and 10.

In the third stage of the theater training program, the STAIR STEP tactical squadrons were initially integrated into USAF contingency

FLYING HOURS FOR STAIR STEP UNITS  
TACTICAL FIGHTER WING AND TACTICAL WINGS  
JANUARY - MARCH 1962

102 TFW	7117 TW	7108 TW	7121 TW	7122 TW	7131 TW
Phalsbourg	Dreux	Chaumont	Etain	Chambley	Toul
F-86H	RF-84F	F-84F	F-84F	F-84F	F-84F

AIRCRAFT O/R AND POSSESSED (AVERAGE FOR JAN THRU MARCH 1962)

% Poss Auth	100%	100%	100%	100%	96%
% O/R Poss	74%	72%	76%	67.4%	73%

FLYING HOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS (JAN THRU MAR 62)

Programmed Hours	6060	1350	2020	2020	2020	2020
% Flown	90%	89%	98%	88%	81%	100%

SOURCE: Hq USAFE Command Control Statement, 31 March 1962. (SECRET)

FLYING HOURS FOR STAIR STEP UNITS  
FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS  
JANUARY - MARCH 1962

<u>151 FIS</u>	<u>197 FIS</u>	<u>157 FIS</u>
Ramstein	Ramstein	Morón
F-104A/B	F-104A/B	F-104A/B

AIRCRAFT O/R AND POSSESSED (AVE FOR JANUARY THRU MARCH 62)

% Poss Auth	98%	100%	94%
% O/R Poss	56.1%	60%	68%

FLYING HOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS (JAN THRU MAR 62)

Programmed Hours	1515	1515	1515
% Flown	65%	72%	98%

SOURCE: Hq USAF Command Control Statement, 31 March 1962. [REDACTED]

Fig. 10

plans for Berlin, and then into the command's general war plans. For these purposes, the recalled ANG squadrons were to execute specific missions in connection with a USAFE contingency plan for Berlin bearing the unclassified nickname of HENNY PENNY, and they were to operate in a general war under the Seventeenth Air Force's Tactical Attack Plan (TAP). Some of the STAIR STEP tactical fighter squadrons assumed theater alert commitments in support of these plans with conventional weapons as early as November 1961. Thereafter, the USAFE augmentation force was continuously exercised and evaluated by CINCSAFE to determine its capability to accomplish the assigned air-to-air, Army close support, tactical strike, and photo reconnaissance roles.

Three major aspects of the USAFE Berlin contingency planning were among the responsibilities assigned to the STAIR STEP primary force in 1961: (a) indirect support of the tripartite air access to Berlin through the positioning of tactical fighters at the western mouth of the corridors, on-call for operations in the corridors on short notice; (b) direct support of Western access to Berlin through tactical fighter escort of transport aircraft in the corridors, or air-to-ground operations in conjunction with ground force movements in the corridors, and (c) counter-air, selective tactical strike, and interdiction missions in support of limited war operations. The latter contingency was envisaged as occurring primarily within Soviet satellite Europe.

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Under the USAFE general war plans, the STAIR STEP tactical fighter aircrews were assigned targets individually by pilot in support of SAGEUR's nuclear strike program, but they were to utilize conventional munitions. In other words, they were to fly ASP target missions as an integral part of the USAFE strike forces, but would attack with conventional weapons such classic interdiction targets as radar sites, railways, roads, and bridges. USAFE provided the STAIR STEP tactical wings with an Intelligence Planning Guide containing materials for 400 targets susceptible to conventional weapons strikes, and these units were preparing the detailed mission plans\* for their assigned nine Category A (automatic) and Category B (non automatic) strike targets per squadron prior to the end of 1961. In the meantime, USAFE had begun testing the readiness of the STAIR STEP tactical units under an exercise plan called KEEN KNIFE, which provided training situations closely paralleling the mission requirements of both HENNY PENNY Berlin contingency and TAP general war plans, and provided the basis for tactical evaluations of these units by the command.

All STAIR STEP tactical fighter squadrons were standing a theater alert requiring 70 percent of the possessed aircraft on O/R alert of three hours, with four aircraft per squadron on one-hour alert during daylight, by 31 December 1961. This alert status phased

\* Since it was planned to send large numbers of conventional attack aircraft against some targets, in contrast to nuclear strike targeting, up to 180 mission folders had to be prepared by some squadrons for primary targets.

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into a 15-minute readiness when a state of military vigilance was declared. The short alert tactical strike aircraft were loaded with gunnery ammunition only, and necessary quantities of other munitions were held close by in order that these aircraft might be quickly loaded for whatever mission was directed.

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All STAIR STEP wings were initially directed by USAFE to fly their orientation missions and cross country sorties in elements of two or more aircraft.<sup>101</sup> Thereafter, the number of aircraft launched were to be dictated by the mission. Early in December 1961, the STAIR STEP force training philosophy was reoriented to emphasize air-ground and fighter sweep missions involving maximum effort flights of 16 to 20 aircraft. This training simulated the large formation flights that would be required in conventional combat operations.\*

Joint air-ground training was greatly increased with the arrival of the recalled ANG wings in Europe. The USAFE had previously been able to commit only about 135 to 150 sorties per month for close support training with USAREUR, except during large exercises. After attending a USAFE Air-Ground Operations School course held at each base, the STAIR STEP wings were on-call daily for Seventh US Army close support training missions. An Army ground liaison officer was attached to each STAIR STEP strike squadron and these units provided PAC's on a continuous basis to designated Seventh US Army units.

\* CINCSAFE also directed Seventeenth Air Force in this period to select one squadron from each USAFE regular force wing for training in conventional weapons deliveries.

Both USAFE and the NATO military forces sponsored maneuvers and flying exercises for the federalized ANG squadrons in the spring of 1962. The most important maneuvers were LONG THRUST II, early in the year, and GRAND SLAM I in April. The STAIR STEP pilots flew air superiority, army close support, and reconnaissance missions as part of an international air arm operating in support of a battle group size NATO field exercise in the Hohenfels training area in West Germany for Exercise LONG THRUST II between 28 January and 5 February 1962. Close air support of ground forces, interdiction, attack, and reconnaissance missions were again stressed in GRAND SLAM I, a joint NATO Central Army and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force exercise during the period 9-13 April.

The STAIR STEP wings were also provided a closer look at the operating techniques and equipment of the other NATO member air forces through the NATO Squadron Exchange Program of Air Forces Central Europe. Under this program, begun 18 months earlier, USAFE detachments of four to 12 pilots, ground crews, and aircraft operated for two week periods from the bases of other NATO member air forces. NATO units, in turn, operated for similar periods from American air bases.

Recalled ANG unit participation included exchange visits by the 102d TFW at Phalsbourg and the 7108th TW at Chaumont with German Air Force units based at Fliegerhorst Leck in Schleswig-Holstein, and the 7121st TW with German Air Force (GAF) units at Hopsten. The 7117th TW, operating from Chaumont, exchanged with units of the Royal

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Netherlands Air Force at Deelin, the Netherlands. From Toul-Rosieres, the 7131st TW exchanged with Royal Belgian Air Force units at Chievres, France, and later with Royal Danish Air Force units at Skrydstrup, Denmark. The 151st and 197th FIS at Ramstein flew together with Norwegian Air Force pilots at Gardermoen, Norway, and French Air Force personnel at Criel, France.

#### 5. Unit Training

The 102d Tactical Fighter Wing at Phalsbourg was directed to assume a one hour alert posture on 19 November with 12 aircraft, F-86H aircrews, and armament crews standing alert for HENNY PENNY commitments from 30 minutes before target sunrise to sunset daily. Since the wing was assigned both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles under this plan, the alert F-86H's were initially armed only with full combat loads of 20-millimeter or 50. caliber ammunition and the immediate loading team training goal was the capability to load all 12 alert aircraft within 45 minutes of receipt of the Seventeenth Air Force Frag Order in one of five appropriate configurations:

- (a) maximum load of 20-millimeter or 50. caliber ammunition;
- (b) two 750 pound (napalm) fire bombs;
- (c) two 750 pound general purpose (GP) bombs;
- (d) four rocket pods of 2.75 rockets per pod,
- or (e) two GP or napalm bombs with two rocket pods.

Twelve F-86H's, 13 aircrews and support personnel totaling 112 people, were deployed to Wheelus Air Base on 22 November 1961 for

\* Reporting this program, the St. Louis Post Dispatch commented that the Royal Danish Air Force had been furnished with United States F-100's, while the Missouri Air National Guard still flew F-84F's.

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weapons delivery qualification training. This contingent established a permanent Flying Training Detachment for the wing at Wheelus.

The 102d Wing flew its first training exercise missions in December, including Exercise CABIN CRUISER and US Army close air support sorties, and low level navigation, ground controlled intercept (GCI) and air-to-ground training at the Suippes Range. CABIN CRUISER was a HENNY PENNY exercise in which two aircraft were periodically flown to two predesignated points and orbited there under GCI control on-call for Berlin air corridor intercept or air transport escort missions. The F-86H's also flew Exercise GUN TALK\* missions, in which the tactical fighters were launched eastward and then turned toward targets in the west to simulate enemy penetrations of the central Europe air defense net, and Exercise QUICK TRAIN,\*\* a no-warning quick reaction test by higher headquarters. Close air support training exercises in conjunction with the Seventh US Army in Europe under the control of GCI sites and Forward Air Controllers (FAC) were begun on 4 December, and the wing completed 19 of these missions before the end of 1961.

In the first six months of 1962, the 102d TFW launched about 5,000 operational sorties to fly approximately 12,000 hours in UE aircraft, including normal air-to-air and air-to-ground training, participation in 12 exercises, three tactical evaluations, and one

\* Seventeenth Air Force Operation Order 609-61.

\*\* Seventeenth Air Force Operation Order 659-61.

RI, and NATO squadron exchange program visits with the German  
 103  
 Air Force units at Leck, Germany. One pilot and aircraft were  
 lost on an army close support mission; a second pilot bailed out  
 due to engine failure, and a third bailed out due to fuel star-  
 vation on GCA final. Of 1,037 close support sorties flown by the  
 wing for the Seventh US Army, 46 were unsuccessful, with communi-  
 cations difficulties and poor target weather causing most of the  
 failures. Weather and ground aborts forced prior cancellation of  
 112 army close support missions. All tactical pilots qualified  
 as operationally ready as a result of 2,000 sorties flown on the  
 Wheelus ranges in this six months period. Poor weather and limited  
 availability permitted only about 600 sorties from Phalsbourg to  
 the Suippes and Siegenberg ranges in Europe. The wing was relieved  
 of its operational training commitments on 15 June 1962, and most  
 of the sorties in the theater thereafter were long range deployment  
 training flights in preparation for return to the United States.

The 7108th Tactical Wing's 141st TFS at Chaumont received its  
 orientation and indoctrination from a USAFE 36th TFW team between  
 6-10 November 1961. 104 Seventeenth Air Force minimums of three  
 theater flights and two letdowns prior to operational flying  
 clearance in the USAFE area were increased by the 7108th to five  
 sorties with letdowns at five different airfields, and 60 percent  
 of these letdowns had to be made in the element lead position.  
 Thereafter, the 141st TFS launched its F-84F's to the Suippes and  
 Siegenberg ranges for dive bombing, skip bombing, and low angle  
 strafing practice when weather permitted.

Planned Exercise GUN TALK participation by the wing on 27 November was stymied by weather, and the wing was scheduled to fly missions for Exercise EYE BALL, a joint air-ground test of FAC and army close support capabilities on 19-20 December, but this maneuver was also cancelled due to poor flying weather. However, the 7108th began CABIN CRUISER missions on 7 December. Several days earlier, the wing had commenced close air support sorties for the Seventh US Army's Fourth Armored Division in Germany.

A theater alert commitment was assumed by the 7108th Tactical Wing in early December 1961, with four fully armed F-84F's and aircrews standing one hour alert. The 141st TFS required six hours to ready 18 armed aircraft for takeoff in a KEEN KNIFE tactical evaluation on 17 December, but had reduced its reaction time to within the USAF 3:15 hours standard by the end of 1961.

The 7108th TW flying hour accomplishments in November and December 1961 were as follows:

	<u>November</u>	<u>December</u>
Hours Programmed	378	526*
Hours Flown	318	529
Sorties Scheduled	322	530
Sorties Flown	173	281
	12 (Unscheduled)	28 (Unscheduled)
Ground Aborts	30	20
	1 (Unscheduled)	
Cancelled for Weather	119 (37% of Scheduled)	229 (43 percent)
Air Aborts	1	6

\* After 75 unused flying hours were turned back.

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In the first six months of 1962, the 7108th TW's 141st TFS flew 4,261 hours in UE aircraft to accomplish weapons training at Wheelus, eight exercises, one tactical evaluation, one ORI, and NATO squadron exchange visits with Germany Air Force units at Leck, Germany. <sup>105</sup> One pilot and his F-84F were lost during a low level mission early in 1962, and a second pilot successfully ejected in flight after a turbine wheel disintegrated and severed his flight control hydraulic system on 16 May. Twenty seven of the 141st squadron's 30 pilots qualified in all modes of conventional weapons delivery during two periods of intensive weapons training at Wheelus Air Base, 17 February to 31 March and 13 May to 23 June. The squadron successfully accomplished 31 out of 35 close air support missions assigned up to 23 June.

In addition to participating in LONG THRUST II and GRAND SLAM I, the 7108th flew missions for Air Defense Command's Exercise INDIAN SUMMER in Spain, 17-18 January, and in central Europe, on 26 April, and tested radar station and close support fighter coordination in Exercise BIG STICK sorties on 20 February and in May 1962. Also in May 7108th TW F-84F's flew Exercise GUN TALK missions and sorties for an Air Defense Command evaluation called Exercise COLD TURKEY. In June, the 141st TFS began preparations to transfer UE F-84F's to the newly activated 366th Tactical Fighter Wing at Chaumont prior to return of the 7108th TW to the United States in mid-July 1962.

The 7121st Tactical Wing at Etain was directed to place four F-84F's on one hour daylight alert for HENNY PENNY and TAP commitments

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effective 20 November 1961. The wing's 166th TFS began army close support missions in accordance with a wing operation order published on 30 November. Training sorties were flown to the Suippes and Siegenberg ranges when weather permitted. Before the end of 1961, the 7121st TW was tested twice under KEEN KNIFE conditions combined with an Exercise QUICK TRAIN quick reaction test.

In the first six months of 1962, the 7121st TW flew 3,826 hours in the UE tactical aircraft, lost one F-84F when the pilot successfully ejected after inflight flameout, and had three aircraft incidents. The 166th accomplished the requalification of all pilots in all modes of conventional weapons delivery through 692 F-84F sorties flown in two training periods at the USAFE Weapons Center prior to 23 June, plus 238 sorties to Suippes and 81 to Siegenberg. The wing was assigned 266 ground support missions by the army in this period, of which 125 were successfully accomplished, 48 were unsuccessful, and 93 were cancelled due to weather, lack of aircraft, or other reasons.

In addition to flying 42 sorties totaling 84 flying hours for Exercise CABIN CRUISER and participating in three tactical evaluations, and two ORIs, and the exchange of NATO squadron visits with German Air Force units at Hopsten in April, the 166th TFS flew sorties for five major exercises in 1962. These exercises included LONG THRUST IIA, GRAND SLAM I, GUN TALK, COLD TURKEY, and INDIAN SUMMER, described earlier, as well as ROUND ROBIN,\* in which six

\* Seventeenth Air Force Operation Order 604-62, 1961.

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F-84F's were provided for NATO recovery base familiarisation at the German Air Force's Ingolstadt Air Base in Bavaria and the French Air Force Base at Dijon, France, in March 1962. The total 7121st operational flying training statistics for the period 14 November 1961 to 30 June 1962 were as follows:

	<u>F-84F</u>	<u>F-33</u>
Total Hours Flown	4482	516
Total Sorties	2778	248
Average Hours Per Aircraft	172	258
Average Sorties per Aircraft	106	124
USAF Weapons Center Sorties	692	
Total Sorties Cancelled Due to Weather	765	

By late May 1962, the 7121st TW was commencing preparations for the turn over of its responsibilities to the newly activated 366th TFW at Chaumont. Air Force personnel were moved from other USAF bases and from the United States to Etain for this purpose during June.

The USAF theater orientation and indoctrination program for the 7122d Tactical Wing at Chambley in November 1961 particularly emphasised "Chattermark" and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) procedures. The 7122d's 163d TFS assumed HENNY PENNY and TAP alert commitments on 4 December. Training sorties were flown to the Suippes and Siegenberg ranges within the limitations of weather and range availability. The squadron's F-84F's also flew CABIN CRUISER, QUICK TRAIN, and US Army close support missions during December, as well as a NATO exercise of the alert notification capability called SUPER CHIEF. The 163d TFS was scheduled to fly 12 sorties in support of Exercise EYE BALL on 21 December, but

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weather permitted only two sorties. The total 7122d TW flying accomplishments in Europe for November and December 1961 were as follows:

Total Sorties Flown	417
Total Sorties Scheduled	812
Weather Aborts	339
Maintenance Aborts	61
ATC Aborts	12
Other Aborts	3
Range Sorties Flown	85
Weather Aborts	44
Maintenance Aborts	20

Between 1 January and 8 June 1962, the 7122d's 163d TFS flew a total of 3,625 hours to accomplish weapons training at the European ranges and Wheelus, US Army close support missions, five major exercises, two local and one higher headquarters tactical evaluation, one USAFE ORI, and NATO Squadron Exchange and ANG Pilot Rotation programs. One F-84F was lost when a pilot crash landed on 15 March after his engine failed and was pulled to safety by French citizens just before the aircraft exploded and burned. The 163d TFS started the year with only 26 pilots for 26 aircraft and, after receiving seven pilots from CONUS F-84F squadrons on 6 January, had 31 pilots in full operationally ready status in June 1962. By that time, with a normal daily commitment of four sorties, the 7122d TW had accomplished 208 US Army close support sorties in 425 flying hours while in the European theater.

In addition to participating in CABIN CRUISER, GUN TALK, COLD TURKEY, and GRAND SLAM I missions, the 7122d TW supplied target aircraft for a 65th Air Division (Defense) ORI in Spain called

Exercise RED EYE; exchanged four pilots and tactical aircraft with the German Air Force's 32d Fighter Bomber Wing, and played host to 20 recalled ANG STAIR STEP follow-on force pilots rotated to the USAFE area for theater orientation briefings and flights. The 163d TFS flew up to 12 sorties daily to Snippes and Siegenberg for practice in dive bombing, skip bombing, Low Altitude Bombing System (LABS) deliveries, rocketry, and strafing, plus 707 sorties in 876 flying hours during two periods at the USAFE Weapons Center, 8 January to 18 February, and 2 April to 14 May 1962.

The 7122d TW received its movement order on 7 June for return to the CONUS after 15 July 1962. The 163d TFS jet aircraft were to be transferred to the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing with headquarters at Chaumont.

The theater orientation and training programs for the 7131st Tactical Wing at Toul-Rosieres in 1961 and 1962 followed the general <sup>111</sup> pattern described above. The 7131st Wing's 110th TFS assumed a HENNY PENNY and TAP Sierra Alert commitment with four F-84F's on one hour daylight alert effective 26 November 1961, and had begun Snippes and Siegenberg sorties, CABIN CRUISER and other exercise tasks, and close support missions for the Seventh US Army's Third Armored Division prior to the end of 1961.

In the first six months of 1962, the 7131st rotated to Wheelus Air Base for weapons training between 4 January and 20 February, and 1 April to 12 May; participated in a number of major exercises, several tactical evaluations and an ORI, and exchanged visits with

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the Royal Danish Air Force's 730th Fighter Bomber Squadron at Skrydstrup, Denmark. <sup>112</sup> The exercises included LONG THRUST IIA, GUN TALK, RED EYE, COLD TURKEY, GRAND SLAM I, BIG STICK, and KEEN KNIFE.

The 7117th Tactical Wing at Dreux received orientation and indoctrination briefings from a USAF 66th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing team after arrival at the overseas station in November 1961, but was prohibited from launching jet aircraft from Dreux by the French government\* throughout its tour in the USAF area. <sup>113</sup> The wing was authorized by USAF on 18 November to rotate tactical aircraft and crews to Chaumont Air Base, some 200 miles away, for their theater orientation flights, and the 106th TRS launched six RF-84F's to Chaumont on the 20th. By the time the first six pilots had completed their minimums of five orientation flights on a five-day rotational basis, the entire 106th TRS was being moved to Chaumont and staged from that base thereafter for photographic training missions, round robin sorties, and penetration and GCA approach practice at USAF bases. The 106th TRS participated in Exercise EYE BALL during December, but weather limited its success to nine out of 56 targets completed in 24 sorties and 42:30 flying hours.

In the first five months of 1962, the 7117th TW accomplished 1,358 operational sorties in 2,325 flying hours while participating in 15 major exercises in the European theater, KEEN KNIFE readiness

\* See pp. 21 - 26, this study.

[REDACTED]

tests, and a USAF ORI conducted at Benguerir Air Base in Morocco  
 114  
 for weather reasons. The exercise tasking included LONG THRUST  
 IIA, GRAND SLAM I, GUN TALK, INDIAN SUMMER, QUICK TRAIN, RED EYE,  
 COLD TURKEY, and SUPER CHIEF, as well as specialized reconnaissance  
 exercises called MAKE HASTE, ROUND ROBIN, SHARP EYES, SKI JUMP, and  
 TEMPO BELLE. Throughout this period, wing pilots were assigned  
 individual operational and exercise targets, and were held responsi-  
 ble for planning the route and type of mission. Four F-84F's, air-  
 crews, and ground support personnel were maintained on one-hour  
 daylight alert for theater commitments. On 1 March, the 106th TRS  
 exchanged aircraft and aircrew visits with the Royal Netherlands Air  
 Force units at Deelen, the Netherlands.

Stationed at McGhee Tyson Airport, Knoxville, Tennessee, upon  
 recall to active service on 1 November 1961, the 151st Fighter-  
 Interceptor Squadron was almost immediately alerted for overseas  
 movement. 115 Some 42 missions flown by the squadron over a 1,350  
 NM course simulating the Argentina to Lajes leg of the planned deploy-  
 ment route to Europe indicated that the UE F-104A/B's would have  
 difficulty in accomplishing this flight safely. Under a higher  
 headquarters decision embodied in a project nicknamed BRASS RING,  
 the Starfighters were disassembled into five parts, i.e., wings,  
 engine, main fuselage, and tail assembly,\* and loaded aboard MATS  
 C-124's for movement overseas. The first Globemaster departed McGhee  
 Tyson Airport on 10 November and the last arrived at Ramstein Air  
 Base in Germany on 27 November 1961.

\* The same procedure had been used earlier for movement of  
 Starfighters to Fermoza.

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The 151st FIS airowebs received condensed theater orientation and indoctrination in European ATC rules and regulations, together with the 197th FIS also deployed to Ramstein, and all of the squadron's combat ready pilots had completed the mandatory three orientation flights by 14 December. Meanwhile, the first F-104 had been reassembled and tested on 20 November, and the last was in commission by 18 December. The 151st assumed a 15-minute alert posture for HENNY PENNY commitments on 9 December 1961.

The initial 197th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron F-104 departed home station at Phoenix, Arizona, accompanied by crew chiefs and maintenance personnel, via a MATS BRASS RING C-124 on 16 November. <sup>116</sup> Almost all of the squadron's personnel and UE aircraft were in place at Ramstein by 22 November, and the 197th FIS completed orientation and Starfighter reassembly testing in time to assume the 15-minute theater alert posture simultaneously with the 151st FIS at Ramstein on 9 December 1961.

The STAIR STEP primary force F-104A/B's were repeatedly grounded <sup>117</sup> for maintenance or air safety reasons in the first six months of 1962. However, the 151st and 197th FIS rotated six F-104's and all squadron pilots through the USAFE Weapons Center at Wheelus in two increments each to fire the GAR-8 missile early in 1962. Also during this period, the 151st FIS exchanged NATO squadron visits with French Air Force units at Criel, France, and the 197th FIS with Royal Norwegian Air Force units at Gardermoen, Norway.

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The federalized ANG 157th FIS aircrews at McIntire Airport, Eastover, South Carolina, flew their F-104A/B's right up to the moment of their disassembly and shipment by MATS C-124's to Moron<sup>118</sup> Air Base in Spain during November 1961. All squadron aircrews completed their Air Force Regulation 60-3 requirements prior to overseas movement, and most of them had reached Moron via MATS by 23 November.

Squadron theater orientation and indoctrination by the 65th Air Division (Defense), and reassembly of the UE aircraft, proceeded rapidly, but test flights were held up by torrential rains over a 17-day period in Spain. Nevertheless, enough F-104's were test flown between 23 and 25 November to permit the 157th FIS to assume an ADC alert commitment on 25 November 1961.

The 157th FIS flew a total of 515 hours in the UE aircraft from recall to the end of 1961, and 2,061 hours in Starfighters between 1 January and the squadron stand down for return to the CONUS on 25 June 1962. Three aircraft and one pilot were lost during the European theater operations. All F-104 aircraft were grounded for maintenance safety reasons over a 14 day period in January, and again for six days in March 1962.

Six F-104's and 50 percent of the 157th's aircrews deployed to Wheelus Air Base in March 1962 to fire the GAR-8 missile. Upon successful completion of their training, they were replaced by the other 50 percent of the squadron's pilots. All squadron aircrews successfully fired the GAR-8 over a two week period without

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curtailment of the 157th's alert commitments. At the end of June 1962, the squadron's UE aircraft were again being disassembled for return to the CONUS.\*

#### 6. The Tactical Control Group

The 152d Tactical Control Group and its seven attached units were located at the time of call up on 1 October 1961 at  
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home stations as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>State</u>
Hq 152d Tac Con Gp	Roslyn, L. I.	New York
101st AC&W Flt	Worcester	Massachusetts
102nd AC&W Sq	Providence	Rhode Island
103rd AC&W Sq	Orange	Connecticut
106th Tac Con Sq	Roslyn, L. I.	New York
108th AC&W Flt	Syracuse	New York
112th AC&W Flt	State College	Pennsylvania
123rd AC&W Sq	Blue Ash	Ohio

The main body of 152d Group personnel was flown from the base nearest home station to Germany by MATS between 7 November and 12 November 1961 without major incident. Some high priority operational equipment was also airlifted, but the bulk of the group's equipment was sealifted and began arriving in Europe at the beginning of December.

The primary mission of the 152d Tactical Control Group upon relocation in West Germany under CINCSAFE was to provide a radar control system for USAF aircraft on offensive tactical missions, including close support, interdiction, reconnaissance, airlift and

\* By that time, in a major retrofit effort to solve the F-104 engine stall problem, 13 J-79-A engines had been replaced by the J-79-B in 157th aircraft.

special support. Secondary missions included: (a) provision of a ground instrument bombing system in support of USAFE strike units in the United Kingdom; (b) furnishing backup air surveillance and control up to 10,000 feet for the central Europe air defense system, and (c) maintaining a full capability to immediately disperse and operate from unimproved sites. In the primary mission radar control of STAIR STEP primary force tactical fighter aircraft flying close air support sorties for the Seventh US Army, the 152d Group had to exercise radar control of these aircraft from home base to the FAC's control point, recover the fighters upon completion of their mission, and maintain radar control of the aircraft back to home base. In addition to the six search radar sites which 152d units were to operate around-the-clock, these units were to man and operate the TDP's located at Mausdorf and Landshut in West Germany.\* The group was also to have a capability, if required, to provide radar control in the Berlin air corridors.

CINCSAFE's operational concepts for the 152d Tactical Control Group stipulated that, to operate effectively as a tactical control system, the 152d should be under the operational control of an air control center (ACC) collocated with and directly subordinate to the Seventeenth Air Force air support operations center (ASOC).<sup>120</sup> Both the ACC and the sector operations center (SOC) would have to be completely mobile in order to deploy with the US Army headquarters

\* Planned inclusion of USAFE MATADOR missile guidance responsibilities in the 152d's missions was not implemented due to the shortness of the group tour in the USAFE area.

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and tactical operations center. Also, to conduct effective training for both ground and air elements, the ACC-ASOC facility should be manned and operated continuously, rather than only during exercises and alerts as in the past. The most logical means of accomplishing daily operations would be to locate the ACC-ASOC adjacent to the Seventh US Army's tactical operations center (SATOC), with US army intelligence and operations personnel being assigned to augment the ASOC staff during daily training and simulated SATOC operations.

CINCUSAREUR concurred in the foregoing concepts, and on 9 October he had agreed to provide a facility for the 152d Group headquarters, the 106th Tactical Control Squadron and the air control center in the Mannheim area. Facilities actually proposed by the army in December 1961, however, were either unsuitable, unavailable, or uninhabitable without extensive renovation.

The 152d's units experienced varying degrees of success in their efforts to become operational in the USAFE area during 1961. The 101st AC&W Flight began erecting technical equipment at Giebelstadt, was directed to move to Gelsheim on 1 December, and was redeployed to Giebelstadt on 21 December. The 102d AC&W Squadron at Celle was unable to erect its equipment pending completion of a facilities agreement for that site. The 103d AC&W Squadron at Rothweston had five PPI's positioned in their S-80 shelter and the search radar antenna assembly completed by 29 December. The 106th Tactical Control Squadron began putting up shelters for the ACC-ASOC

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and associated facilities at Funari Barracks in Mannheim, about three miles away, on 21 December. The 108th AC&W Flight's site at Hamm was not ready, and the unit remained at Sembach Air Base until movement approval was received early in 1962. The 108th completed its move to Hamm on 19 February, but was forced by facilities shortages to position the unit's support functions at Gutersloh, some 47 road miles away. The 112th AC&W Flight at Buschel had its radar operations shelter set up and had begun installing equipment in the final week of December, while the 123d AC&W Squadron's operations at Landshut were held up by damage to the AN/MP-16 set during unloading.

In summary, at the end of 1961, four of the 152d Tactical Control Group's AC&W squadrons and flights were almost operational. Two, the 102d and 108th, were delayed by circumstances beyond their control.

Despite its repeated relocations, the 101st AC&W Flight at Giebelstadt was the first 152d unit to begin passing traffic to the ACC, on 19 January 1962. By 19 February, all group units had become operational and were reporting their tracks to the 106th TCS air control center at Mannheim. The locations of these units at that time were:

Unit	Location
Hq 152d Tac Con Gp	Mannheim, Germany
101st AC&W Flt	Giebelstadt
102nd AC&W Sq	Celle
103rd AC&W Sq	Rothweston
106th Tac Con Sq	Mannheim
108th AC&W Flt	Hamm/Gutersloh
112th AC&W Flt	Buschel
123rd AC&W Sq	Landshut

During the four month period that the 152d's tactical control system was operational in the European theater, between 19 January

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and 19 May 1962, in addition to its normal mission activities under the Seventeenth Air Force's BIG STICK operation plan, group units participated in two major exercises. For LONG THRUST IIA in January and February, the 101st AC&W Flight and the 123d AC&W Squadron provided close air support radar control for Fourth ATAF strikes in the US Army's Hohenfels training area and reported to the 106th's AGC for display to the director of the ASOC. By LONG THRUST's end, the 101st had controlled 60 of 133 scheduled missions, with 60 weather cancellations and 10 no shows, and the 123d had controlled 55 of a scheduled 135 missions.

All of the 152d's units participated in GRAND SLAM I in April 1962. Close air support missions under radar control were an important phase of this joint Fourth ATAF and Central Army Group ground-air exercise, and about 3,600 aircraft sorties were scheduled.

#### 7. Operational Readiness Status

Initial KEEN KNIFE tactical evaluations of the STAIR STEP primary force fighter wings were begun by USAFE prior to the end of 1961, and only the 7108th and 7122d Tactical Wings were rated as <sup>121</sup>Satisfactory. These first tests indicated that the 102d Tactical Fighter Wing and the 7121st and 7131st Tactical Wings did not have a capability to effectively carry out the assigned theater missions under wartime conditions. The individual pilot capability was acceptable, but there were serious weaknesses in the wing combat operations center (COC) operations, aircrew briefings, ordnance handling, and aircraft turn-around times. The 102d, 7121st and 7131st wings could not meet the launch sequence rate called for in the exercise plan.

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The command STAIR STEP unit tactical evaluations in 1961 also revealed a general weakness in war plan knowledge, personnel indoctrination, and command control of available resources.<sup>122</sup>

Aircraft incommision rates were low, and there were serious shortages in ammunition specialists, and in aerospace ground equipment. Facility construction was needed at all of the bases where STAIR STEP units were stationed.

After additional USAFE guidance and assistance, the 102d TWF and 7121st and 7131st TW's were rated Satisfactory in tactical evaluations early in 1962.<sup>123</sup> In fact, the 102d and 7131st wings had made outstanding progress. USAFE tactical evaluation of the 7117th Tactical Wing in March rated the reconnaissance unit as Satisfactory.

Subsequent operational readiness inspections by USAFE of the STAIR STEP primary force in the spring of 1962 found all of these units Satisfactory except the 7121st Tactical Wing and the 152d Tactical Control Group.<sup>124</sup> These findings were also reflected in USAFE Command Control Statement (CCS) criteria for the same period.

The USAFE ORI of the 7121st TW in February 1962 rated the unit G-3. Contributing factors were an aircraft O/R rate of 52 percent during the flying phase, and 18 aircraft launched in 7 hours and 8 minutes versus the 3:15 hour standard. Dive bombing and air-to-air gunnery were unsatisfactory by Air Force standards.

The 152d Tactical Control Group was rated in its ORI as incapable of performing the wartime offensive missions and aerial surveillance. There were deficiencies in command and operational

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control, director knowledge, facility manning, mobility, status boards, communications, alerting, and security.

A second tactical evaluation of the group on 16 May resulted in a Satisfactory rating. <sup>125</sup> The unit demonstrated an ability to control offensive mission aircraft adequately. The most serious remaining defect was the slow handling of communications.

All of the STAIR STEP tactical wings had across-the-board shortages in aircrew training for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1962; mainly attributed to poor flying weather and the grounding of all F-84F's for maintenance. The federalized ANG F-104 squadrons were not formally evaluated by USAF in 1962. However, all of them were unsatisfactory by USAF CCS standards in the first three months of 1962 because of grounding for unscheduled maintenance and the failure of main landing gear forward door cylinder brackets due to fatigue.

The STAIR STEP primary force F-84F's were also grounded on 15 March 1962 as a result of aileron control safety rod failure. MOAMA did not have adequate spares, but initiated a local manufacturing program and had shipped the necessary rod replacements to USAF by 31 March. The F-84F units resumed flying in the second week of April.

Headquarters USAF advised CINCSAFE on 21 December 1961 that it was considered that the deployment of augmentation forces to Europe should permit a higher VICTOR ALERT status for the regularly assigned USAF tactical strike squadrons. <sup>126</sup> CINCSAFE replied

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that the augmentation had no direct influence on the number of aircraft per squadron that could be maintained on VICTOR ALERT. In any case, USAFE strike squadrons currently committed to SACEUR's nuclear strike program fully met the established numerical requirements.

#### E. SUPPORT FACTORS

##### 1. Base Facilities

The USAFE dispersed operating bases and dispersed emergency bases (DEB) in France had deteriorated considerably following the departure of the command's fighter wings under Project RED RICHARD at the end of 1959, because their upkeep needs had to compete with the higher priority MOB's for the limited funds available. <sup>127</sup> All of the DOB's were on a standby basis in 1961 with small caretaker detachments of the 7544th Support Group at Toul-Rosières Air Base providing a minimum peacetime exercise and wartime dispersal capability. The US Army was using Etain Air Base, and Dreux housed USEUCOM communications activities and a dependent school. Former USAFE ammunition storage depots at Chize and St. Mihiel in France were being transferred to USAREUR in mid-1961.

Thus, the DOD's renewed emphasis upon conventional weapons and the STAIR STEP primary force deployment to the USAFE DOB's in France during November 1961 imposed very heavy facility support demands upon the command with very little advance notice. <sup>128</sup> Meeting these demands at all required an enormous amount of USAFE staff effort, and not all of them could be met prior to the ANG unit deployment.

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Fig 11

STAIR STEP WING  
AVERAGE MONTHLY COSTS AT ETAIN  
1961

Personnel	\$346,161
Military - 129 Officers	
974 Airmen	
DAFC	2,000
LWR Civ	13,500
Travel & Per Diem	6,700
Transportation of Things	3,800
Subsistence	21,000
Educational Services	800
Electricity	8,000
Heating Fuel	15,700
Base Maintenance Contract	47,000
Communications Toll Charges	1,200
Repair & Construction	33,800
Contractual Repair of Equipment	1,000
Ground Fuel and Oil	4,700
Supplies (Locally Funded)	43,800
Equipment (Locally Funded)	11,000
Medical Expenses	1,500
Ammunition	22,000
Aviation Fuel & Oil	32,000
 TOTAL MONTHLY AVERAGE EXPENSES:	 \$616,261

SOURCE: History 7121st Tactical Wing, 1 October to 31 December 1961.

The STAIR STEP planning also entailed unprogrammed costs for housing, messing, aircraft and vehicle maintenance, and base civil engineer facilities, pavement repair, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) storage, communications, and fire protection.<sup>129</sup> These costs were ever and above the additional Fiscal Year 1962 funding requirements for equipage and a 30-day supply inventory at USAFE bases for both the primary and follow-on\* ANG forces.

The USAFE dispersed operating bases at Chambley, Chaumont, Etain, and Phalsbourg, and the DEB's at Brienne, Chalons, Chennevieres, and Voursiers, all in France, were surveyed by Seventeenth Air Force as early as 8 August 1961 to estimate the costs of rehabilitating and modifying these installations to receive STAIR STEP units.<sup>130</sup> On 23 August, Headquarters USAFE allocated \$108,000 for the purchase of pavement repair materials to rehabilitate the runways at Chambley, Chaumont, and Etain with command equipment and personnel from German bases. That same month, CINCSAFE informed Headquarters USAF that the pavement and facility repairs at the DOB's would probably require US Army engineer assistance if they were to be completed in time for the STAIR STEP deployment.<sup>131</sup>

USAFE representatives presented the initial STAIR STEP construction program to the Air Staff at Washington on 25 August 1961, and programming documents were subsequently prepared for all projects

\* The command received consumption data, however, only for the 11 federalized ANG units of the primary force actually deployed.

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required at the bases finally selected toward the end of August for the primary force deployment. These documents included a specially prepared Air Force Form 16A with a project title, total estimated cost, scope, and description, plus base maps which sited all proposed facilities. This submission covered 115 projects totaling estimated costs of \$6,184,700 principally for the reactivated DOB's.

Proposed 152d Tactical Control Group sites in Germany were surveyed on 23 October and 22 projects were developed for Buechel, Celle, Gelsheim, Hamm, Landshut, Mausdorf, and Rothweston at a total estimated cost of \$319,700.<sup>132</sup> Six Filloid buildings were dismantled at Dreux Air Base and shipped to Germany to expedite urgent facility projects for the tactical control group.

STAIR STEP deployment site surveys in the USAFE area finally encompassed 250 facility projects at 14 command bases.<sup>133</sup> About 190 of these projects were approved at an estimated cost of about \$8.7 million. Some 69 P-341 projects costing \$5.3 million were funded by Headquarters USAF on an expedited basis, and the higher headquarters granted an increase of \$1,225,000 for STAIR STEP support to the USAFE Fiscal Year 1962 P-459 Program funding of \$2,620,000. At the end of June 1962, there were 186 STAIR STEP facility projects in the USAFE.<sup>134</sup> Of these, 72 had been completed, and the remainder were 75 percent or more complete.

Base civil engineers from the active USAFE bases were informed during a meeting at Headquarters USAFE on 8 September 1961 that

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first phase STAIR STEP facility construction would be accomplished by US Army engineer or GSU effort. The bases were to provide the materials for the first phase. Certain projects were identified for base in-service capability or Seventeenth Air Force design, and others for architect-engineer contracting.\* French Government clearance for rehabilitation and improvement of USAFE bases at Chambley, Chaumont, Etain, Laon, Phalsbourg, and Toul-Rosières was requested by CINCUSAFE on 13 September 1961, as well as French authorization for the construction of one 10,000 barrel bolted down steel POL tank each at Breux and Evreux air bases.

Headquarters USAFE special orders taking effect on 1 November 1961 reclassified Chambley, Chaumont, Etain, and Phalsbourg air bases in France from detached to primary installations, with real estate accountability being transferred from Toul-Rosières Air Base to the primary installations. A similar action was taken for Dreux Air Base, with jurisdiction and accountability being transferred from the 322d Air Division at Evreux to Seventeenth Air Force. Negotiations were completed by 8 November for USAF reoccupation of 40 housing units at Phalsbourg and 100 at Sarrebourg, France, which had been turned back to the French under Project RED RICHARD.

\* Before the end of 1961, 15 STAIR STEP facility design projects in France and five in Germany had been contracted to two architect-engineer firms, with project costs estimated at \$2,088,200 and fees \$58,003.

2. USAREUR Use of USAF Facilities

Until late 1961, nearly all of the USAF-built facilities at Etain Air Base in France were occupied by five USAREUR logistical support units totaling over 1100 people.<sup>136</sup> To permit the 121st TFW STAIR STEP deployment to Etain, CINCUSAFE requested that these army units vacate the installation by 1 November. CINCUSAREUR resisted this move, and asked CINCUSAFE to utilize another base, because USAREUR loss of Etain would disrupt the operation of a major aircraft maintenance and supply unit and an associated signal retrofit unit, and would delay important rail spur construction by the 249th Engineer Battalion. CINCUSAREUR also anticipated morale and financial hardships from the loss of dependent support facilities at Etain.

On 22 September, USCINCEUR directed USAREUR to vacate Etain at a date to be agreed upon between CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR.<sup>137</sup> The 121st TFW advance party found upon arrival at the base on 20 October that the Army had a 21 November date for evacuation. This was advanced by negotiation to 29 October, with the 249th Engineer Battalion moving to the opposite side of the base, and the other army units elsewhere in France. The departing USAREUR units stripped the base of items ranging from library books\* to water faucets, and this later contributed to a 7121st TFW Congressional complaint problem.

Prior to September 1961, negotiations had been undertaken with French authorities to transfer the USAF conventional ammunition

\* Later retrieved by the Air Force

storage sites at Chize and St. Mihiel in France to USAREUR. As part of the conventional war and STAIR STEP augmentation planning, CINCUSAFE in September proposed that the Air Force retain use of all of St. Mihiel's facilities, but place the depot administration under USAREUR control. CINCUSAREUR rejected this proposal, and toward the end of September, USCINCEUR directed that CINCUSAFE retain both ownership and control of St. Mihiel for the purpose of building up Air Force Class V reserves. <sup>139</sup>

### 3. Army Support of STAIR STEP Construction

In peacetime, USAREUR supported CINCUSAFE by furnishing army engineer units for various Air Force construction projects. <sup>140</sup> In wartime, USAREUR would have to furnish emergency troop construction to 10 USAF bases located in France and Germany.

Emergency troop construction requirements for some 28 projects at Chambley, Chaumont, Etain, Phalsbourg, and Toul-Rosières costing an estimated \$1,851,000 were submitted to USAREUR by CINCUSAFE late in September 1961. <sup>141</sup> CINCUSAFE estimated that at least three army engineer construction battalions would be required to finish these projects within four months. The JCS approved a USAREUR recommendation for the deployment of these battalions, plus one headquarters and headquarters company, one dump truck company, and one support company, but stipulated that all costs would be borne by the Air Force for a 120-day temporary duty period. CINCUSAFE disapproved this arrangement because the value of the construction that could be accomplished in so short a period would not justify the expense to the Air Force.

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General Landon asked that the engineer units be permanently stationed in Europe, that they be immediately available to support his emergency requirements, and that the USAF pay only the direct support costs. In reply, the Department of the Army cancelled the movement of these units to Europe.

CINCUSAREUR agreed with the USAFE position, stating that the 249th Construction Battalion had started work at Chambloy, Etain, and Toul, but that these airfield construction projects would not be completed until August 1962 if only this unit was used. However, the Department of the Army rejected CINCUSAREUR's contention that he could not provide increased troop construction support to USAFE without a permanent increase in his construction battalion resources, and suggested that USAREUR provide a proportionate share of available engineer units to USAFE.

When CINCUSAFE established additional construction requirements at Chaumont and Laon late in 1961, one of two construction battalions sent to USAREUR's Communications Zone in France as part of the overall Army augmentation program in Europe was assigned to fulfill USAFE STAIR STEP facility construction needs. In the meantime, base contracts had been let at Chaumont and Phalsbourg for urgent construction projects originally scheduled for Army engineer accomplishment. Nonetheless, the 249th and 32d US Army Engineer Battalions provided invaluable support to USAFE's construction programs in support of the STAIR STEP deployment; particularly, with respect to working when commercial contractors were unavailable or unable to work.

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#### 4. Supply and Maintenance

Support of the STAIR STEP deployment in 1961 required CINCSAFE to establish a 30 day supply of war consumables for the programmed augmentation force, to redistribute supplies and equipment in the United Kingdom and central Europe, and to redistribute certain Middle East "limited war" assets when these items were not readily available elsewhere. The supply precedence categories of the federalized ANG units were raised to a level comparable to like active duty units, and the AFLC was authorized to redistribute until 1 January 1962 critically needed support items for the USAFE augmentation. War consumables were programmed to be in place by 1 January 1962 except for newer types of weapons, and USAFE had substitutes available for the latter in all categories other than GAR-8 and GAM-83.

The STAIR STEP Unit Support Equipment (USE) authorization listing was accomplished by USAFE prior to their arrival in the theater, and in place SEAWEEK assets were applied against these USE requirements. Unit Maintenance Equipment (UME) lists furnished by TAC were screened against USAFE excesses, with the two commands coordinating on the final STAIR STEP unit Authorization List (UAL). USAFE completed these UAL listings from card decks furnished by TAC and forwarded them to the deployed ANG units on 15 December 1961.

Survey of the ammunition requirements over and above the existing onbase and depot assets to support Berlin contingency operations and 30 days combat sorties from installations where STAIR STEP units were located disclosed a need for 6,000 additional tons of ammunition.

The reserve stockage for STAIR STEP forces was established at five days munitions prestocked on base, with a further 25 days retained at the Morbach and St. Mihiel Ammunition Storage Depots in central Europe; however, on 24 October 1961, the base resupply capability was bolstered by storing munitions on the bases to the maximum extent permitted by Air Force Regulation 86-6 quantity-distance criteria. The initial additive munition stocks were received from the CONUS early in November, and the St. Mihiel depot immediately began carrying out a CINCSAFE directive that maximum efforts be made to prestock the full 30-days authorizations on the bases. All of the federalized ANG tactical fighter wings experienced UMD shortages for munitions handlers and serious cross-training problems after arrival in Europe.<sup>144</sup> These personnel lacked knowledge, experience, and training in conventional weapons.

Headquarters USAFE placed procurement orders in the CONUS for some \$1,200,000 worth of military personnel quarters furniture and \$285,000 worth of warehouse bins and shelves.<sup>145</sup> Redistribution instructions were issued for bedding, de-icing fluid, office equipment, fire extinguishers, dining hall equipment, personal clothing, and escape and evasion kit items.

The STAIR STEP tactical units deployed with Fly-Away Kits (FAK) and were placed under STAR procedures for aircraft spares upon arrival in the USAFE area.<sup>146</sup> However, the FAK's for identical types of aircraft ranged from 572 to 2500 line items and there was a lack of experience in the use of these kits, as well as shortages in

qualified people in this field. The STAR resupply pipeline times in 1961 ran nearly double the desired seven days even when assisted by air parcel post deliveries.

Spare engine support of F-84 and F-86 aircraft had been a subject of considerable anxiety in the STAIR STEP deployment planning, but this problem was solved by the salvage of engines at the Aircraft Storage Site at Davis-Monthan Air Base, Arizona. Quick Engine Change (QEC) kits were a critical problem following the arrival of the federalized ANG units in the European theater, especially for F-86H's and F-104A's. The Starfighter QEC kits were placed on emergency procurement by Sacramento Air Materiel Area (SMAMA).

At some cost to command mission capability, 2,300 of the 2,800 vehicles required by the STAIR STEP units in Europe were furnished from USAFE resources. Minimum essential repair was provided for vehicles taken from SEAWEEED stocks through an Air Materiel Force, European Area (AMFEA) contract.

Twelve C-47 support aircraft were provided from Air National Guard resources as part of the STAIR STEP primary force deployment. All of the federalized ANG units had going AFM 66-1 organizations upon arrival in the USAFE area, but they had to improvise the supporting communications equipment until procurement action was completed by USAFE early in 1962. As noted earlier,\* several serious maintenance and modification problems were encountered in the federalized

\* See p. 66, this study.

ANG tactical aircraft operations, and the resulting stand-downs had a considerable impact upon unit flying hour programs and operational readiness rates.

Communications maintenance personnel were included in the house-keeping detachments at the USAFE DOB's in France and the impact of the STAIR STEP deployment was minimized to some extent by the availability of wire communications to support this mission.<sup>151</sup> By December 1961, the augmentation forces at each base had direct "hot" voice and teletype lines to the Seventeenth Air Force Kindsbach Cave COC near Ramstein; telephone trunk facilities to the main switching centers at Vernou and Siegelbach; Aerospace Communications Net; COMLOGNET; flight service and air traffic control; navigational aids, and weather communications facilities. Good progress was being made on the establishment of STAIR STEP wing combat operations centers.

Some of the STAIR STEP primary force units arrived in Europe with a minimum of tactical communications equipment, since the bulk of these items had been shipped by sea. The communications-electronic personnel deployments averaged less than 50 percent of the UMD requirements. Former ANG units equipped with AN/TRC-24 "C" band sets were able to obtain frequencies for the northern region of West Germany but not in the southern and eastern areas saturated by in-place US Army troops. Action was initiated by CINCSAFE to replace this ANG equipment or augment it with 900 and 1600 megacycle band sets. Also, the STAIR STEP augmentation represented a significant increase in the number of tactical air-ground frequencies used by USAFE and this

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requirement had to be met initially by reducing the number of frequencies assigned to the in-place regular force units. CINCUSAFE closely monitored the provision of communications-electronic support to his augmentation forces.

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##### 5. Summary

The adequacy of the overall logistic support provided to STAIR STEP units deployed to the USAF area was of major concern at high levels and it was intensively evaluated by both the CINCUSAFE and the Air Staff a number of times prior to the end of 1961; most notably by two USAF Inspector General teams in the period 22 October to 22 November. The resulting reports pinpointed weaknesses and deficiencies in plans and programs; operations; facilities; maintenance; supply; funding; manning, and other areas. Many of these weaknesses stemmed from the deployment of federalized ANG forces with personnel and equipment shortages, due to inadequate preparation. Adequate war consumables to support contingency operations were not on hand at the STAIR STEP bases and the unit FAK's were not standardized. Modification of F-86H and F-84F aircraft was essential to assure compatibility with CBU-1/A and CBU-2/A munitions and the MA-3 rocket launcher. Nevertheless, accelerated actions by CINCUSAFE and other responsible agencies brought all of the STAIR STEP tactical units to a point where they were capable of accomplishing their assigned missions in the spring of 1962.\*

## F. REDEPLOYMENT TO THE CONUS 1962

1. ANG Demobilisation Planning

TAC was directed by Headquarters USAF on 16 January 1962 to begin planning for the return of mobilized Air National Guard units from Europe sometime in calendar year 1962.<sup>154</sup> Although a return date could not be forecast in January, it was already anticipated that the STAIR STEP units would revert to inactive status following their arrival in the United States.

Further Headquarters USAF guidance in March stated that the redeployment and release time must be compressed to the degree commensurate with: (a) retention of existing combat capability in Europe as long as possible; (b) expedited redeployment to minimize the impact upon enroute support units, and (c) arrival at CONUS home stations with sufficient remaining active duty time for personnel processing prior to release from active duty.<sup>155</sup> The general time schedule established the return at 45 days prior to release from active duty and close-in at home stations not later than 15 days prior to release.

→ In April, as a result of the SOD's recommendation based on across-the-board improvements in the United States military posture subsequent to the summer of 1961, the President announced that involuntarily recalled Armed Forces reserve personnel would be relieved from active duty shortly after mid-year.<sup>156</sup> However, in view of the international political climate, the USAF was directed to maintain a high state of readiness in the regular forces both during and following the reserve

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unit demobilization. Implementing instructions subsequently established 31 August 1961 as the date for roll up of the mobilized reserve forces recalled for Fiscal Year 1962.<sup>157</sup> CINCUSAFE was assigned primary responsibility for: (a) scheduling the return of STAIR STEP personnel and equipment to the COMUS; (b) maintaining the directed force level at maximum capability during the exchange of mobilized ANG units for certain regular force units, and (c) bed down and support of all units as directed.

In planning for the return of the STAIR STEP forces to the COMUS CINCUSAFE had two prime objectives: (a) to assure a safe and efficient redeployment, and (b) to assure that the vacated bases were converted to effective use as dispersed operating bases.<sup>158</sup> The initial return schedule proposed by CINCUSAFE on 9 March 1962 provided a 60-day period in which the augmentation units could be used to assist in the phasedown of the bases in France to DOB status. The Headquarters USAF reply on 21 March, however, specified a maximum of 30 days from the time the STAIR STEP aircraft departed until the last mobilized reservist left the overseas base. The DOB's had undergone a building program amounting to over \$7 million, the conventional war consumables had been increased twelvefold, and there had been substantial increases in the UME and USE inventories at these bases, which should be retained after the STAIR STEP units departed. Quantities of supplies were still flowing into the theater and would have to be received and warehoused by USAF. General Landon's greatest concern in early April, therefore, was

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that the ANG wings might leave the French dispersed operating bases in a helter skelter condition before some 465 manpower spaces he had requested for residual DOB housekeeping purposes were actually provided by Headquarters USAF.

In the following weeks, as discussed later on, decisions were taken by Headquarters USAF which affected not only the USAF DOB's in France, but also the tactical fighter forces in the command.<sup>159</sup> In essence, during the return of the mobilized ANG forces from Europe, additional regular force squadrons were programmed for the command to insure the maintenance of a high level of operational capability. The resulting new requirement for base support planning in 1962 envisioned a high level of DOB readiness at Chaumont, Chambley, Etain and Phalsbourg, in France, as well as at Saultorpe in the United Kingdom, through the activation of combat support groups at these stations.

→ By April 1962, it had become public knowledge that the USAF planned to replace the 11 ANG squadrons flown to Europe the previous autumn in whole or in part by TAC regular force units.<sup>160</sup> Five additional tactical wings were to be formed, one of them in Europe, as SAC B-47 wings were deactivated. When the ANG wings returned to the CONUS, they were to leave most of their F-84F's behind them to equip the new four squadron USAF wing. Eventually, these older airplanes were scheduled for replacement by the Republic F-105 and the McDonnell F-110.

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The necessary time phased actions to accomplish redeployment of the federalized ANG STAIR STEP primary force of 11 tactical squadrons and a tactical control group back to the CONUS and to implement the new regular force augmentation planning were embodied in a USAFE Programming Plan published on 8 May 1962.<sup>161</sup> The ANG force redeployment operation was subsequently designated as HIGH TOP. Redeployment was to commence with release of the 152d Tactical Control Group from its operational and training commitments on 19 May and terminate with the airlift of F-104A/B squadron personnel and aircraft from Moron in Spain to home station in the CONUS prior to 15 August.

Under the HIGH TOP planning, the 141st, 163d and 166th TFS at Chaumont, Chambley and Etain, respectively, were to leave their F-84F's and support items in Europe to equip USAFE's new 366th Tactical Fighter Wing. The 110th TFS at Toul-Rosieres was to transfer the necessary additional aircraft to make a total of 80 F-84F's. An interim tactical control system was to be established by USAFE to provide an offensive tactical control capability in central Europe during the time period between the redeployment of the federalized ANG 152d TCG and the operation of a mobile 412d (CASF) tactical control system in this area.

## 2. The HIGH TOP Operation

On 7 June, the 86th Air Division (Defense) was ordered to move as soon as practicable after 20 June the 151st and 197th FIS from Ramstein to McGhee Tyson Airport, Tennessee, and to Sky Harbor

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Municipal Airport, Phoenix, Arizona, respectively. <sup>162</sup> The same day, the 102d, 108th, 121st, 122d and 131st TFW's (ADVON) were ordered to move at the earliest practicable date after 15 July to home stations in the CONUS. <sup>163</sup> Advanced echelons were authorized to move as of 1 July.

On 12 June, the 152d TCG was ordered to begin movement as soon as possible after 7 July to the United States. <sup>164</sup> Advanced echelons were authorized to move as of 22 June. All of the STAIR STEP primary force units were to be reassigned from USAF to TAG upon arrival in the United States. Public release of the schedule for phasing out the recalled reserve forces in 1962 was made by Headquarters USAF on 11 June. <sup>165</sup>

CINCUSAF had recommended to Headquarters USAF in April that the 152d TCG be relieved of operational commitments as early as mid-May for redeployment as soon as personnel and equipment were ready, because this would conserve construction funds and speed transfer of USAF resources to the establishment of the interim tactical control system. <sup>166</sup> This recommendation was in accordance with a command program to resurvey STAIR STEP facility construction to determine which projects should be continued. The 152d TCG stood down on 19 May and completed the preparation of unit equipment totalling in excess of 20,000 tons on 25 June to permit an accelerated redeployment flow schedule for this unit. The 152d TCG advanced echelon arrived at Andrews Air Force Base on 9 July to establish a centralized processing center at Belling Air Force Base for separation of the

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group's 2,029 personnel at the rate of 100 per day, and received an impromptu greeting by the President, the Secretary of the Air Force, and General LeMay.  
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Headquarters USAF in May had established 16 July as the date to start redeployment of the mobilized ANG units in Europe to the CONUS.  
168 Units flying tactical aircraft were directed to stage through Prestwick on 17 July and to complete the entire flow of 113 F-86H's, RF-84F's and F-84's through Keflavik, Sondrestrom, and Goose Bay by 20 July. The 106th TFS operating from Chaumont and the 110th TFS at Toul-Rosieres launched their aircraft on 16 July.  
169 The 102d TFW's 101st and 131st TFS departed Phalsbourg on 17 July, followed by the 138th TFS the next day. The three F-86H, one RF-84F and one F-84F squadrons returned to the CONUS in Operation HIGH TOP once again received maximum assistance and support from many Air Force commands and agencies, and all of them had arrived at home stations by 22 July without accident.

Redeployment of the federalized ANG F-104A/B squadrons from Germany and Spain in July and August 1962 was also accomplished without major incident. AFLC maintenance teams were sent to the USAFE area to assist in the disassembly of the Starfighters for MATS airlift. The FIS movement from Ramstein in mid-July coincided with runway repairs at that base.

Between 1 July and 31 August 1962, a wide variety of MATS transports returned more than 9,600 STAIR STEP primary force personnel and 1,400 tons of equipment, including fighter aircraft, from

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the USAFE area to the United States. MATS C-97's, C-118's, C-121's, C-124's and C-135's flew over 260 airlift missions in returning the ANG units. Some 24 of these missions were flown by C-97's of the federalized ANG units completing their active duty with MATS.

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General LeMay said of the HIGH TOP Operation:

I wish to commend TAC, its Air National Guard units, USAFE, and all other commands and personnel associated with Operation HIGH TOP for outstanding professionalism in planning and executing all phases of the redeployment operation. Support of TAC redeployment of the ANG squadrons by SAC, MATS, ADC and USAFE reflects great credit upon all personnel for the high standards maintained in briefing, controlling, communicating, and providing rescue support and assuring the general safety and welfare of redeployed units.

The quality of the ANG participation and their safety so capably supported by all personnel will long be remembered as a truly professional job accomplished by a team of which I am justly proud.

CINCUSAFE expressed his appreciation to members of the federalized ANG and AFR units returning to the United States in letters to the commanders citing the men for their personal sacrifice and an overall demonstration of "duty and dedication."

Each honorably separated Air Force reservist and air national guardsman concluding his Berlin contingency tour received a certificate of appreciation signed by the Secretary of the Air Force and the USAF Chief of Staff.

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### 3. Follow-On Augmentation Planning

USAF planning in the spring of 1962 for replacement of the mobilized ANG units in Europe by regular forces encompassed 11 fighter squadrons, plus the activation in the theater of a tactical control system.<sup>174</sup> The 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, a four squadron F-84F organization, was activated at Chaumont Air Base in France during May 1962. The wing utilized STAIR STEP primary force aircraft and equipment left behind by the redeploying federalized ANG units and, for the most part, personnel resources of the deactivating USAF 47th Bomb Wing (Tactical) in the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the 366th TFW was to have one squadron each stationed at Chaumont, Chambley, Etain and Phalsbourg with primary conventional missions. The TAC rotational F-104C squadron already at Hahn Air Base in Germany was retained in the theater.

The regular force augmentation plans for USAF programmed two TAC F-105B squadrons for six months temporary duty in Europe when the ANG tactical fighters were returned to the United States. Deployment of an additional four TACK HAMMER F-100D squadrons to USAF bases was also contemplated, with these units remaining in Europe only as long as the Berlin situation urgently required. However, on 19 June, TAC advised Headquarters USAF that aircraft modification programs and the resulting low flying hours for pilot proficiency would preclude the scheduled deployment of two full squadrons of F-105B's to USAF on 1 August.<sup>175</sup> Late in June, Headquarters USAF cancelled plans for movement of the four

TACK HAMMER F-100D squadrons to Europe. In the following months, USAF regular force augmentation planning was over-shadowed at least temporarily by the demands of the Cuban crisis upon CONUS-based tactical air power.

In the meantime, the 366th TFW progressed toward operational readiness with its F-84F aircraft.<sup>176</sup> The crux of the wing mission was that the Seventeenth Air Force felt it did not have a capability in the spring of 1962 to assume the currently assigned conventional air-ground and air to air alert commitments requiring 40 aircraft for a period in excess of 10 days, upon redeployment of the STAIR STEP primary force.<sup>177</sup> Any period of increased alert commitment beyond 10 days for the existing intheater regular forces would have seriously degraded the USAF strike force primary and secondary mission efforts.

Combat support groups were activated at the USAF dispersed operating bases in 1962 to assume the housekeeping duties upon the departure of mobilized ANG units.<sup>178</sup> Additional manning, war reserve materiel, and equipment was programmed for these DOB's to meet three prime requirements: (a) support of USAF dispersed tactical squadrons within six hours; (b) support of TAC additive units within 24 hours, and (c) support of a STAIR STEP type deployment with 10 to 15 days notice.

Demobilization of the 152d Tactical Control Group posed a particular problem for USAF and USAF planners in the light of the general increase in emphasis upon limited war capabilities during

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1961. This emphasis, in turn, had raised the importance of air-ground support of army operations in USAF's central area, and it was apparent that a capability to support both joint training exercises and initial contingency operations should exist in a USAF transportable tactical control system. The non-STAIR STEP unit tactical control capability in central Europe was committed to NATO in a fixed environment and had lost its potential for mobile deployment to meet contingencies. In any case, this system would be unable to support programmed conventionally committed USAF forces in a conventional engagement.

Following intensive study at Headquarters USAF and by the Headquarters USAF and Seventeenth Air Force staffs in early 1962, programming documents were published in the command at mid-year for the establishment of an interim tactical control system in central Europe to replace the demobilized 152d TCG. <sup>180</sup> A permanent system utilizing mobile 412L Air Weapons Control System (AWCS) equipment was programmed to become operational in 1963. These plans established the deployment and operational concepts of the USAF tactical control system and the responsibilities for administration and logistic support of the 601st Tactical Control Squadron and its subordinate units, the prime operators of the system.

In contrast to the older system, the new tactical control radar facilities were highly mobile, with improved range and small forward air controller posts (FACP's) which could be more easily

concealed. They would provide CINCUSAFE with a means of inflight control of offensive mission forces for day to day training as well as for actual conflict.

Augmentation planning for the USAFE area as a reflection of Kennedy Administration defense policies appeared to have arrived at full circle in October 1962 when Headquarters USAF advised CINCUSAFE that plans should be made to carry out smoothly any future exercising by the President of his recently approved interim authority to recall reserve and air national guard forces during an emergency. <sup>182</sup> Two wing headquarters and seven tactical groups had been identified to the OSD for possible recall and deployment if necessary to Europe in the event the President used his interim authority. The National Guard Bureau and Headquarters USAF were taking action in the later part of 1962 to peak these units through increased training and manning, and higher equipping precedence ratings. However, Headquarters USAF cautioned that this planning was not to be construed as being indicative of imminent recall of the units in question.

#### G. THE LESSONS LEARNED

##### 1. From CINCUSAFE's Viewpoint

USAFE experience with the mobilized Air National Guard units in 1961 and 1962 was relatively brief --about nine months <sup>183</sup> in all. However, it was clear that the achievement of a general state of operational readiness in the relatively small STAIR STEP primary force had required a major diversion of

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Headquarters USAFE and subordinate command staff effort. The availability of the federalized ANG units for conventional air-ground and air to air operations, on the other hand, did not free the USAFE regular force from enough existing commitments to permit an increased Quick Reaction Alert or VICTOR ALERT in the atomic strike units.

The multiplicity of major changes in all facets of the STAIR STEP deployment planning gravely hampered everyone concerned in reacting properly within the required time periods. <sup>184</sup> Also, the initial planning phases were handicapped by the high security classification of the planning documents.

Deployment of the mobilized ANG forces to Europe demonstrated that the current USAFE command and control structure (following the assignment of Third Air Force tactical units and their bases in the United Kingdom to Seventeenth Air Force on 1 July) was inadequate even when only one third of the total STAIR STEP force <sup>185</sup> deployed to the USAFE area. With only one over-extended operational numbered air force headquarters, USAFE lacked the essential flexibility to provide for the control and direction of additional nuclear and conventional forces which might be deployed in an emergency.

Prior to 1961, Air National Guard units were not considered as forces to be deployed to the USAFE area in a conventional warfare role short of general war. <sup>186</sup> As a result, the UMD's, equipment, war reserve materiel, and training concepts of these

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units required extensive revision before they could attain an effective operational capability in the overseas theater. CINCSAFE believed that it might be well if in the future specific reserve units could be identified for deployment to the USAFE area and kept abreast of the theater plans under which they would operate as well as the conditions they must expect to find in the overseas theater through the constant indoctrination of key officers.

Understandably, there was some disagreement among the authorities concerned with respect to the usefulness of deploying ANG units overseas with obsolete equipment. On the other hand, it was generally considered by the USAFE staff that the employment of these units in possible limited Berlin air corridor operations might have some merit.

In terms of possible combat escalation, the mobilized ANG units were not considered by the USAFE operations staff to be potentially effective in the initial stages of a general war. Moreover, in the STAIR STEP deployment, the USAFE bases were saturated with the obsolescent ANG aircraft to a point where it would have been difficult to receive the theater-trained TAC F-100 and F-105 additive forces in the command area in an emergency. These TAC forces were considered as having an immediate nuclear and conventional capability for both air offensive and ground support roles, while the STAIR STEP augmentation squadrons required extensive theater training before they could become fully operational. In view of these factors, Headquarters USAFE had recommended before the end of 1961 that TAC

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regular force squadrons be deployed in any future USAFE augmentation rather than reserve forces.

In any case, it seemed evident that inactive duty ANG training programs required revitalization and retailoring to actual active duty needs with emphasis on regular Air Force methods and procedures; particularly, Air Force Manual 66-1 and COC/CP operations. This should be associated with greater stability in the ANG employment concepts to insure that insofar as possible individuals performed on active duty the jobs for which they had been trained. A cellular UMD and UAL could provide a foundation for this concept.

In addition, the major STAIR STEP unit problems of base support and experienced command control and direction could be eliminated by limiting future deployments of ANG squadrons to established active bases. The soundness of this course of action was demonstrated by the fewer difficulties encountered by the three STAIR STEP primary force units stationed on main operating bases in the European theater.

Also, the ANG units should have a number of UMD's and mobility plans: one contemplating deployment to Europe to a main operating base, another to a DOB, and others for non-European areas. The overseas gaining commands should participate in the preparation of these UMD's and plans. Then, when a contingency arose anywhere in the world requiring ANG federalization, the applicable UMD force and support package could be mobilized and deployed.

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In summary, USAFE experience with the STAIR STEP primary force units in 1961 and 1962 indicated an urgent need for formulation of firm concepts for the utilization of reserve forces in future contingency situations. Should they be deployed PCS like the STAIR STEP primary force or TDY like the TAG CASF ? Should mobilized reserve units be used as an initial contingency force or to replace TACK HAMMER units deployed earlier ? There was a requirement to determine whether or not war readiness materiel (WRM) should be pre-stocked for ANG forces -and where.

2. From The STAIR STEP Unit Viewpoint\*

The mobilized Air National Guard units involved in the deployment to the USAFE area during 1961 and 1962 were confident that most members of the ANG and Air Force Reserve were proud, patriotic citizens who wanted and expected to be called into active military service when the requirement was clear. <sup>187</sup> They did not want their personal lives disrupted when the need for recall to active duty was not clearly established and supported by prompt, firm decisions, planning and mission assignment.

The ANG unit commanders generally recognized that the indecision which, in their opinion, had been associated with the call up of the reserve forces in 1961 stemmed primarily from political

\* In most instances, these comments represent a consensus of the opinions and recommendations expressed in the semiannual histories of the USAFE STAIR STEP units in 1961 and 1962. Where possible, individual sources are indicated in the footnotes.

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considerations outside the purview of the Air Force. They recommended that in future the Air National Guard be assigned definite roles and missions in both general and limited war planning.

It seemed clear that if ANG forces were to be effective immediately upon mobilization, they would have to be organized and manned for their active duty roles while on inactive status; otherwise, operational readiness and instant reaction capability for USAF reserve forces would never be a reality. This should also be applied to equipping. If additional equipment would be required by reserve units in their tactical wartime roles, this equipment should be provided by the Air Force and the gaining command in peacetime.

For example, most Air National Guard unit UMD's did not include personnel for commercial transportation, liquid oxygen plant operation, civil engineering, and a number of other functions, although these personnel were required the instant the ANG unit was federalized. Nor were the peacetime ANG wing manning documents realistic for round-the-clock operations. In short, the main problem was that the ANG unit manning documents and equipment were designed for training and not for actual operations. One suggested solution was that the gaining command begin exercising operational control as soon as the decision was made for recall, in order to provide quicker guidance on UMD needs.

The STAIR STEP primary force units were nearly unanimous in their belief that one of the most serious mistakes of all in the overseas deployment was the decision to split the wing headquarters into CONUS and forward elements. They contended that the heavy demands upon coordinated staff action subsequent to arrival overseas demanded fully manned, experienced, and closely integrated wing staffs at the overseas station.

Further, there was a definite feeling in some of the deployed ANG units that rear echelon and/or follow-on elements of the ANG wings had retained rather more of the experienced personnel than seemed wise. Under the split wing headquarters concept, at least one wing commander elected to remain in the CONUS and to retain most of his experienced staff officers.

Due to the repeated UMD changes, almost 30 percent of the airmen in some STAIR STEP primary force units found themselves not only recalled to active duty but also assigned to duties for which they had not been trained while on inactive status. This greatly multiplied both the unit personnel and individual morale problems.

The classification of the early STAIR STEP planning documents, coupled with the necessity to obtain security clearances for ANG personnel after their recall, was universally mentioned as an administrative and planning bottleneck. The ANG units believed that key wing personnel should be cleared for access to classified Air Force planning documents on a "need to know" basis, whether they were on active duty or not.

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The lack of accurate and timely unclassified information for internal use carried over into the ANG information programs. At times, the public information officers of these units were obliged to withhold replies to press queries about matters that were common knowledge. In one instance, all members of the 108th Tactical Fighter Wing were informed of the overseas destination while still at McGuire, but TAC refused release of this information. Similarly, the composition and equipment of this unit was common knowledge while it was part of the Air National Guard, but became classified information when the unit was federalized.

Some of the STAIR STEP primary force units complained of a lack of USAFE advisory personnel for theater orientation and indoctrination purposes. Others reported that their operations suffered from over visitation after the unit reached the overseas station.

### 3. Higher Level Comments

The overseas deployment of the ANG STAIR STEP force during 1961 and 1962 made history in many ways. <sup>188</sup> It was the largest single overseas deployment of jet fighter aircraft and marked the first time that Air National Guard RF-84F aircraft had flown the Atlantic. It established a remarkable record with respect to the short space of time between recall to active duty and deployment to an overseas theater.

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The Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Eugene M. Zuckert, spoke in glowing terms of the performance of the 25,900 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel called up in 1961:

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We are very proud of the speed, efficiency, and professionalism with which both our Reserve Forces and our active duty forces met the current challenge.

Department of Defense and Air National Guard planning at the end of 1962 for further contingencies embodied many of the foregoing "lessons." For example, it appeared that specific ANG units would be earmarked for particular operations and areas, and that they would be organized on a more flexible, cellular basis.

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49. Deptel 1338, Secy State to US Emb Paris, 26 Sep 61. SECRET.
50. Embtel 1440, US Emb Paris to Secy State, 14 Sep 61. SECRET. And Msg VCINC 46797, CINCUSAFE to USEUCOM, 6 Sep 61. SECRET; Embtel 1339, US Emb Paris to Secy State, 14 Sep 61. SECRET; Msg ECJDJ9 93132, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 13 Sep 61. SECRET; Msg ECJDF9 93570, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, c. September 1961. SECRET; Embtel 1973, US Emb Paris to Secy State, 11 Oct 61. SECRET; Embtel 2157, US Emb Paris to Secy State, 20 Oct 61. SECRET.
51. Embtel 112, US Emb Bonn to Hq USAF, 11 Sep 61. SECRET; Embtel 572, US Emb Bonn to Secy State, 11 Sep 61. SECRET; Embtel 584, US Emb Bonn to Secy State, 12 Sep 61. SECRET; Msg ECJDF9 93154, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 13 Sep 61. SECRET. Embtel 637, US Emb Bonn to Secy State, 15 Sep 61. SECRET.

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58. Msg OII 53159, CINCUSAFE to OSAF, 24 Nov 61. CONFIDENTIAL; Alabama Newspaper Clippings, c. November 1961.
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67. Hist 7121st TW, Oct-Dec 61, Foreword. SECRET; And SDO 1072, Comdr TAC to CofS USAF, 19 Oct 61. SECRET; Msg S-61 10037, USAF Inspection Team to CofS USAF, 22 Oct 61. SECRET; Msg SYCAS 10-003, USAF Inspection Team to CofS USAF, 23 Oct 61. SECRET.
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69. USAF Ops Order 822-61, 16 Oct 61. SECRET. Cited in fn 71.
70. USAF Summary Control Statement, 22 Nov 61 (STAIR STEP). SECRET.
71. Hists 102d TFW, 7108th, 7117th, 7121st, 7122d and 7131st TW's, Oct-Dec 61. SECRET.
72. Msg TOCE-C 12042, Comdr TAC to CINCUSAFE and Other Addressees, 28 Oct 61. SECRET.
73. St Louis Dispatch, "Air Guardsmen Say Red Ships Spied on Them," 10 May 62; Msg TOOD-ORI 11949, Comdr TAC to CINCUSAFE and Other Addressees; 24 Oct 61. SECRET; Msg TOOD-O 11198, Comdr TAC to CINCUSAFE and Other Addressees, 28 Oct 61. SECRET.
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81. Msg OPRN 61518, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 24 Nov 61. SECRET.
82. Msg OPRB 61739, CINCUSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, c. December 1961. SECRET.

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93. Hist 17th AF, Jul-Dec 61, p. 24. SECRET.
94. Hq USAFE Briefing for ANG Party by Lt Col F.M. O'Connor, Hq USAFE DCS/Ops, Air Def Div, 31 Mar 62. SECRET.
95. Hq USAFE Command Control Statement, Strike Force, 31 Dec 61, p. 14. SECRET.
96. Hq USAFE Briefing for ANG Party, 31 Mar 62. SECRET.
97. Hq 17th AF Prog Plan 524-61, 4 Oct 61, pp. 2,3. SECRET.
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100. Ltr Gen Gough to Cofs USAF, 15 Dec 61, subj: Report of Visit to USAFE. SECRET. Cited in fn 86.

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111. Hist 7131st TW, Oct-Dec 61. SECRET.
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115. Hist 151st FIS, Nov-Dec 61, pp. 1-4. SECRET.
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117. Hist 151st and 197th FIS, Jan-Jun 62. SECRET.
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137. Hist 7121st TW, Jul-Dec 61, p. 2. SECRET.
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151. Staff Agency Hist Hq USAF DCS/Comm, Dir Plans & Progs, Jul-Dec 61, p. 13. SECRET.
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158. Ltr Gen Truman H. Landon, CINCUSAFE to Gen Curtis E. LeMay, CofS USAF, 3 Apr 62. SECRET.
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163. Hq 17 AF Movement Orders 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, 7 Jun 62.
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169. Hq 17 AF Ops Order 6-39-62 (HIGH TOP), 4 Jan 62. SECRET;  
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171. Msg AFIIS 68409, CSAF to Comdr TAC, 23 Jul 62.
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173. Msg APCR-1 63330, Hq USAF to CINCUSAFE, 3 Jul 62.
174. Msg AFCAV 79228, Hq USAF to CINCUSAFE and Other Addressees,  
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84608, Hq USAF to CINCUSAFE and Other Addressees, 2 May 62.  
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185. Hq USAFE Prog Plan (Draft), 27 Mar 62, subj: (U) USAFE Reorganization Plan, pp. 1, 2. SECRET.
186. Hist USAFE DCS/Ops, Dir Prog, Jul-Dec 61, pp. 2, 3. SECRET.
187. Statement by Commander, 7117th Tactical Wing in Hist 7117th TW, Oct-Dec 61. SECRET. Information used is Unclassified.
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DEPLOYMENT BASE DATA  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT TO USAFE AREA  
1961 - 1962

ANNEX I

## CHAMBLEY STAIR STEP UNITS

122 Tactical Fighter Wing (Hq Baer Field, Indiana)  
 Commander, Brigadier General William R. Sefton  
 Number and Type of Aircraft - 26 F-84F, 2 T-33, 1 C-47  
 Officer in Charge, Advance Party - Colonel Keene

Approximate Strengths

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>AIRMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
TF WG	27	93	120
163 TF SQ (Baer Field, Ind) (Fort Wayne)	36	56	92
122 AEW SQ	4	68	72
122 CAM SQ	4	190	194
122 AB GP	21	103	124
122 AP SQ	3	119	122
122 OPS SQ	6	85	91
122 CE SQ	6	96	102
122 SUP SQ	6	175	181
122 TRANS SQ	4	84	88
122 TAC HOSP	14	38	52
TOTALS	131	1107	1238

## Significant Problem Areas:

Crowded conditions until departure of TAC Fighter Squadrons to CONUS.

# CHAMBLEY AIR BASE

Last Tenant: 21st Fighter Bomber Wing. Inactivated 8 February 1958.

Other Major Units Presently on Base: 429th TFS - to ConUS (474th TFW-Cannon AFB) 13 Nov. 523d TFS - to ConUS (27th TFW - Cannon AFB) 17 Nov. Several other minor support detachments. Army engineers.

## Facilities (Total)

## Recreational Facilities

Nav Aids - Beacon, TACAN, GCA  
(Moselle Control)  
Runway - 8000 ft.  
Overruns - 839 ft. each end  
Barrier - Mal  
Housing - 3 BOQ's - 161 men  
          10 Bks - 1340 Airmen  
          244 Family units, trailers

Warehouses - 12 buildings, 100,840 sq. ft.

Hangars - 3 - 62307 sq. ft.

Shops - 4 buildings 69854 sq. ft.

Open Storage - 201,123 sq. ft.

Mess Halls - 3 - 1350 capacity

## In operation:

Service Club

Officer's Club

Library

Theater (352 seats)

Exchange

Bowling Alley (4 lanes)

Wood Hobby Shop (ready)

## Needs rehab and/or equipment:

NCO Club

Outdoor Areas (laid out but overgrown)

Locale: Located in Lorraine, 20 miles southwest of Metz, 35 miles southwest of Verdun and 15 miles from Toul Air Base. World War I battle area.

## CHAUMONT STAIR STEP UNITS

108 Tactical Fighter Wing (Hq McGuire AFB, N.J.)  
 Commander, Brigadier General Donald J. Strait  
 Number and Type of Aircraft - 26 F-84F, 2 T-33, 1 C-47  
 Officer in Charge, Advance Party - Colonel Joseph D. Zink

<u>Approximate Strengths</u>			
<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>AIRMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
TF WG	27	93	120
141 TF SQ (McGuire AFB, N.J.)	35	56	91
108 AEM SQ	4	68	72
108 CAM SQ	4	190	194
108 AB GP	21	103	124
108 AP SQ	3	119	122
108 OPS SQ	6	85	91
108 CE SQ	6	96	102
108 SUP SQ	6	175	181
108 TRANS SQ	4	84	92
108 TAC HOSP	14	38	52
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>1107</b>	<b>1237</b>

Significant Problem Areas:

None

### CHAUMONT AIR BASE

Last Tenant: 48th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100D&F) moved to UK (Lakenheath) on 14 January 1960.

Other Major Units Presently on Base: None, however, several detachments and OLs. Army engineers.

#### Facilities (Total)

Nav Aids - Beacon, TACAN, GCA  
(Approach Control)  
Runway - 8000 ft.  
Overruns - 839 ft. each end  
Barrier - MAL  
Housing - 3 BOQ's - 120 men  
          14 Bks. - 1806 Airmen  
          3 Family units, trailers  
          108 Family units, off-base

Shops - 9 buildings, 93142 sq. ft.

Warehouses - 10 buildings, 114, 986 sq. ft.

Hangars - 3 - 62700 sq. ft.

Open Storage - 715,302 sq. ft.

Mess Halls - 1 - 2000 capacity

#### Recreational Facilities

##### In operation:

Officer's Club

Library

Theater (500 seats)

Exchange

Bowling Alley (6 lanes)

##### Needs rehab and/or equipment:

Service Club

NGO Club

Outdoor Areas, including 9  
hole golf course (overgrown)

Gymnasium (needs equipment)

Locale: Located in Suize and Marne valleys, 150 miles southeast of Paris, 50 miles north of Dijon.  
Agricultural area. Chaumont nearest town has glove factories and tanneries.

## DREUX STAIR STEP UNITS

117 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Hq Birmingham, Ala.)  
 Commander, Brigadier General George R. Doster, Jr.  
 Number and Type of Aircraft - 20 RF-84F, 2 T-33, 1 C-47  
 Officer in Charge, Advance Party - Colonel Willis B. Hewbold

UNIT	<u>Approximate Strengths</u>		
	OFFICER	AIRMEN	TOTAL
117 TR WG	28	85	113
106 TR SQ (Birmingham, Ala.)	31	68	99
117 REC TEC SQ	16	105	121
117 AEM SQ	3	55	58
117 CAM SQ	4	160	164
117 AB GP	21	92	113
117 AP SQ	3	119	122
117 OPS SQ	6	85	91
117 CE SQ	5	79	84
117 SUP SQ	5	162	167
117 TRANS SQ	4	84	88
117 TAC HOSP	8	25	33
TOTALS	134	1119	1253

## Significant Problem Areas:

French Air Traffic Control Agencies have reservations regarding jet traffic in the Paris area. Authority has been given for initial landings but not operations. Government to government agreements have been requested.

DREUX AIR BASE

Last Tenant: 10th, 11th, and 12th Troop Carrier Squadrons (C-119G) of the 322d Air Division. Squadrons discontinued 8 January 1961.

Other Major Units Presently on Base: 7305th Support Sq, DACCC (Joint Military Comm Control Center) Co A 29 Signal Btn (USA), OL of 7135th School Group operates base grammar school and area high school. Boarding facilities for high school.

Facilities (Total)

Nav Aids - Beacon, TAQAN, TVOR, GCA  
Evreux approach control

Runway - 7900 ft.

Overruns - 300 ft. being extended to 1000 ft.

Barrier - MAL

Housing - 3 BOQ's - 157 men  
15 Bks - 1932 Airmen  
294 Family units, trailers

Shops - 1 - 28615 sq. ft.

Warehouses - 7 - 167,843 sq. ft.

Hangars - 6 - 228,718 sq. ft.

Mess Halls - 3 - 2500 capacity

Open Storage - 35076 sq. yds.

Recreational FacilitiesIn operation:

Gymnasium

Service Club

NCO Club

Officer's Club

Library

Hobby Shops

Education Center

Rod & Gun Club

Needs rehab and/or equipment:

Theater (345 seats)

Bowling Alley (6 lanes)

Outdoor Areas (including 9  
hole golf course)

Locals: Located 20 miles southwest of Dreux (population 20,000), 50 miles west of Paris. Agricultural Region. In Roman period, Dreux was the intersection of Roman highways.

## ETAIR STAIR STEP UNITS

121 Tactical Fighter Wing (Hq Lockbourne AFB, Ohio)  
 Commander, Colonel Dale E. Shafer, Jr.  
 Number and Type of Aircraft - 26 F-84F, 2 T-33, 1 C-47  
 Officer in Charge, Advance Party - L/C Keok

Approximate Strengths

UNIT	OFFICER	AIRMEN	TOTAL
121 TF WG	27	93	120
166 TF SQ (Lockbourne AFB, Ohio)	36	56	92
121 AEM SQ	4	68	72
121 CAM SQ	4	190	194
121 AB GP	21	103	124
121 AP SQ	3	119	122
121 OPS SQ	6	85	91
121 CE SQ	6	96	102
121 SUP SQ	6	175	181
121 TRANS SQ	4	84	88
121 TAC HOSP	14	38	52
TOTALS	131	1107	1238

## Significant Problem Areas:

Overcrowded because of Army aircraft maintenance and engineer units.  
 Army will move these to Brienne Air Base on or before 20 November.  
 ANG support elements requested to delay deployment until 20 November.

ETAIN AIR BASE

Last Tenant: 49th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-100) moved to Spangdahlem 20 August 1959.

Other Major Units Presently on Base: Army Base Detachment, 582d Aircraft Maint Co, Signal Retrofit Unit, 97th Eng Bn - (all to move to Brienne), 249th Eng Bn - Part of this unit will remain at Etain.

Facilities (Total)Recreational Facilities

Nav Aids - Beacon, TACAN, GCA  
(Moselle Control)

Runway - 8000 ft.

Overruns - 839 ft. each end

Barrier - MA1

Housing - 3 BOQ's - 120 men  
10 Bks - 1340 Airmen  
189 Family units, trailers

Warehouses - 4 - 76096 sq. ft.

Hangars - 3 - 64341 sq. ft.

Shops - 3 - 95093 sq. ft.

Open Storage - 122,994 sq. ft.

Mess Halls - 2 - 1500 capacity

School - 2 buildings 278 capacity

In operation:

All facilities in  
operation - operated  
by Army

Airmen's Club

Service Club

NCO Club

Officer's Club

Theater (250 seats)

Library

Exchange

Outdoor Areas

Gymnasium

Needs rehab and/or equipment:

Bowling Alley (6 lanes)

Hobby Shops

**Locale:** Located in Meuse, an area of historical interest from 420 AD. Territory of invasions and battlefields - Maginot Line. Agricultural region. Steel mills and mines nearby. Nearest city, Nancy.

## PHALSBURG STAIR STEP UNITS

102 Tactical Fighter Wing (Hq Logan IAP, Mass.)  
 Commander, Brigadier General Charles W. Sweeney  
 Number and Type of Aircraft - 78 F-86H, 2 T-33, 1 C-47  
 Officer in Charge, Advance Party - L/C Norman LaForest

Approximate Strengths

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>AIRMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
TF WG HQ	38	135	173
131 TF SQ (Barnes MAP, Mass.) (Westfield)	39	177	216
138 TF SQ (Hancock Field, NY) (Syracuse)	36	56	92
101 TF SQ (Logan IAP, Mass.) (Boston)	36	56	92
102 AEM SQ	5	140	145
102 CAM SQ	5	272	277
102 AB GP	24	121	145
102 AP SQ	3	195	198
102 OPS SQ	9	123	132
102 OE SQ	7	138	145
102 SUP SQ	12	287	299
102 TRANS SQ	6	139	145
102 TAC HOSP	14	40	54
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>1879</b>	<b>2113</b>

## Significant Problem Areas:

French approval for acquisition of additional real estate for ammunition storage area expected shortly. Ammo storage criteria waiver is required.

PHALSBURG AIR BASE

Last Tenant: 513 Fighter Interceptor Squadron (36th Wg) - F-86D A/C discontinued 8 January 1961.  
32d and 38th TRS moved to Toul Air Base, October 1960.

Other Major Units Presently on Base: Several minor detachments and operating locations. Army engineers.

Facilities (Total)Recreational Facilities

Nav Aids - Beacon, TACAN, CCA,  
Uses Moselle Control

Runway - 7900 ft.

Overruns - 954 and 906 ft.

Barrier - 2 each M4A

Housing - 3 BOQ's - 109 men  
11 Bks - 1419 Airmen  
77 Government owned trailers  
276 Guaranteed rental quarters

Shops - 3 buildings - 42721 sq. ft.

Warehouses - 4 buildings - 61091 sq. ft.

Hangars - 3 - 69186 sq. ft.

Mess Halls - 2 - 1500 capacity

Open Storage - 14025 sq. yds.

In operation:

Airmen's Club

Officer's Club

Library

Rod & Gun Club

Theater (248 seats)

Exchange

Bowling Alley (6 lanes)

Hobby Shops

Needs rehab and/or equipment:

Service Club

NCO Club

Outdoor Areas (overgrown)

Gymnasium

Locale: Alsace, Lorraine region. Only nearby town is Phalstbourg (population 4,000). Agricultural region.

## TOUL STAIR STEP UNITS

131 Tactical Fighter Wing (Hq Lambert Field, Mo.)  
 Commander, Colonel Glennon T. Moran  
 Number and Type of Aircraft - 26 F-84F, 2 T-33, 1 C-47  
 Officer in Charge, Advance Party - Colonel W.J. Weime

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>Approximate Strengths</u>		
	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>AIRMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
TF WG	28	73	101
110 TF SQ (Lambert Field, Mo.) (St. Louis)	36	56	92
131 AEM SQ	4	68	72
131 CAM SQ	4	190	194
TOTALS	72	387	459

## Significant Problem Areas:

Overcrowded due to number of units on base. 32d and 38th TRS will move to Laon by 15 March 62 or prior to arrival of follow-on squadrons. Augmentation force support units were reduced and the TFW will be supported by the 7544th Support Group. Base to be reassigned to TFW within 30 days.

# TOUL ROSIERES AIR BASE

Other Major Units Presently on Base: 32d Tac Recon Sq, 38 Tac Recon Sq, 2d Comm Sq (MOB), Hq 7544th Sup Gp, Hq 6th TAC Depot Sq, 1952 Comm Sq, 608 TAC Hosp, 7544th Supp Sq, Army engineers.

## Facilities (Total)

## Recreational Facilities

Nav Aids - Beacon, TACAN, GCA  
(Moselle Control)

Runway - 8000 ft.

Overruns - 839 ft. each end

Barrier - MAL-Swedish

Housing - 4 BOQ's - 151 men  
18 Bks - 1802 Airmen  
203 Family units, trailers  
320 Family units, off-base

Shops - 6 buildings - 75854 sq. ft.

Warehouses - 22 buildings - 156,895 sq. ft.

Hangars - 3 - 62955 sq. ft.

Open Storage - 232,197 sq. ft.

Mess Halls - 2 buildings - 2500 capacity

School-3 buildings - 600 students

### In operation:

Bowling Alley (6 lanes)

Gymnasium

Service Club

NCO Club

Officer's Club

Hobby Shops

Theater

Library

Rod & Gun Club

Aero Club

### Needs rehab and/or equipment:

Education Center

Outdoor Areas

Locale: Located in Lorraine Plateau on Moselle River. Air Base is 16 miles northwest of Nancy - 184 miles due east of Paris. Elevation 934. Nearest community is adjacent village of Rosieres in Hays (population 250). Farming, Lorraine iron mines nearby. Toul is 10 miles southwest. Metz 45 miles north.

## STAIR STEP TACTICAL CONTROL GROUP

152d Tactical Control Group (Hq Roslyn Airport, N.Y.)  
 Commander, Colonel W.E. Magalhães

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u> (All Germany)	<u>ETA</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	
			<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>AIRMAN</u>
GP HQ	Mannheim	8 Nov	26	72
106 TC SQ	Mannheim	8 Nov	36	278
101 AC&W FLT	Gelsheim	8 Nov	36	285
102 AC&W SQ*	Celle	8 Nov	25	248
103 AC&W SQ*	Rothwesten	8 Nov	25	248
108 AC&W FLT	Hamm	8 Nov	36	285
112 AC&W FLT	Buechel	8 Nov	36	285
123 AC&W SQ	Landshut	8 Nov	25	248
TOTALS			245	1949

\*A Target Direction Post composed of 66 personnel from these squadrons will be located at Mausdorf.

## Significant Problem Areas:

**HAMM -** Unsuitable due to poor facilities for water, messing and sewage. RAF has been approached for use of Gutersloh. If not available, may operate in mobile configuration out of Sembach.

**BUECHEL -** Inadequate messing facility.

**COMMUNICATIONS -** Negotiations under way with Army for required frequencies. Land lines being leased for initial operations.

**EQUIPMENT -** Part of this not due to arrive until December 1961.

# GLOSSARY

ACC	Air Control Center
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACAW	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADC	Air Defense Command
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFR	Air Force Reserve
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code; Air Force Systems Command
AIRCEMT	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
AMFEA	Air Materiel Force, European Area
AMRO	American Military Relief Organisation
ANG	Air National Guard
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company
ASOC	Air Support Operations Center
ASP	Atomic Strike Plan; Atomic Strike Program
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
ATC	Air Traffic Control
AWCS	Air Weapons Control System
BASC	Berlin Air Safety Center
CALT	Combined Airlift Task Force
CCS	Command Control Statement
CHAS	Chateauroux Air Station
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command
CINCELM	Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCUSAFE	Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe
CINCUSAREUR	Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Europe
COC	Combat Operations Center
COIN	Counter Insurgency
COMAC	Continental Air Command
CONARC	Continental Army Command
CONUS	Continental United States
DEB	Dispersed Emergency Base
DOB	Dispersed Operating Base
DOD	Department of Defense
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FACP	Forward Air Controller Post
FAK	Fly-Away Kit
FOL	Forward Operating Location
FY	Fiscal Year

GAF	German Air Force
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
GCI	Ground Controlled Interception
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GP	General Purpose
GPF	General Purpose Force
GYA	German Youth Activities
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LABS	Low Altitude Bombing System
MAAG	Military Assistance and Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MLO	Moroccan Liaison Office (USAFE)
MOB	Main Operating Base
MUSLO	Moroccan US Liaison Office
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NM	Nautical Mile
NSC	National Security Council
OR	Operationally Ready
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
QEC	Quick Engine Change
RAF	Royal Air Force
SAAMA	San Antonio Air Materiel Area
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SATOC	Seventh Army's Tactical Operations Center
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SMAMA	Sacramento Air Materiel Area
SOC	Sector Operations Center
SOD	Secretary of Defense
STOL	Short Take-off and Landing
STRAC	Strategic Army Corps
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAP	Tactical Attack Plan
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron

TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TRS	Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
TRW	Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
TUSLOG	The United States Logistics Group
UND	Unit Manning Document
UME	Unit Maintenance Equipment
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USCINCEUR	United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe
USE	Unit Support Equipment
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USFA	United States Forces in Austria
USMTM	United States Military Training Mission
USNAVEUR	United States Navy, Europe
WRM	War Reserve Materiel
ZEL	Zero-Length Launch